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This thesis traces the history of the practice of and organization
for operations research in the United States Navy. The author points
out that operations research was being conducted in the U.S. Navy be-
fore operations research became identified as a separate science. From
that point its growth, major accomplishments and organizational changes
are described. The final part of the thesis outlines the organization
through which the Navy conducts its operations research and systems
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The practice of operations research in the United States Navy did
not become common or continuous until the advent of the Second World
War. There have been isolated examples of military operations research,
however, since the beginning of time.
In the third century B.C. King Hiero of Syracuse called on Archimedes
to apply his scientific talent to help break the siege of Marcel lus the
Roman. It appears that Archimedes, after considering the problem, be-
came hardware oriented and started inventing engines of war. (As a
good operations researcher he should have been studying operations in
order to optimize their effectiveness instead.) In 212 B.C. Marcel lus
took Syracuse. Archimedes was put to death by Roman soldiers in spite
of orders to the contrary issued by Marcel lus who may have wanted to
make use of Archimedes" talents himself. It was a long time until
another scientist allowed himself to become embroiled in the cauldron
of war.
In 1694 Sir Issac Newton foresaw the need for analysts at the
operational level. He stated his views in a letter as follows:
"If, instead of sending the observations of able seamen to able
mathematicians on land, the land would send able mathematicians to
sea it would signify much more to the improvement of navigation
and the safety of men's lives and estates on that element,,"
Gradually more complex weapons of war came into use and some men
began thinking of warfare as a science rather than as an art. One
such man was Marshal of France, the Marquis de Vauban who was Louis
XIV"s engineer and military operations research analyst (although
the term did not yet exist,) Vauban wrote tactical guides for the
construction of fortifications such that defensive fire would be
more effective. He also wrote a tactical doctrine based on geometry,
for attacking fortifications. This emphasized the best use of local
terrains and advancing zigzag trench systems.
Although much of Vauban' s efforts were directed towards the
building of better machinery which is not operations research, he
did apply the scientific method to operational situations and there-
by improved the utilization of existant weapons. These scientifi-
cally oriented efforts to optimize the output or utilization of an
existant system do qualify as operations research. He was a
scientist at the Operational level which, as we shall see, was one
of the basic precepts of operations research when it was first con-
ceived of as a separate (science), Vauban s most important con-
tribution to modern warfare, however, was to show that it might
best be considered a science and not an art. It has taken a long
time for this concept to be widely accepted, in fact there is still
controversy on the point.
Until the year 1845 instruction for Naval officers in the
United States Navy was largely conducted on board ship and an
officer s formal education was considered complete once he reached
the rank of Lieutenant, A result of this policy was that the of-
ficers of the Navy were excellent seamen but had little background
to approach warfare in a scientific manner. Finally in October
1845 the Naval Academy was established at Fort Severn, Annapolis,
Maryland. From that day on the advent of operations research in the
Navy was almost inevitable,
During the Civil War Secretary of the Navy Gideon Wells requested
scientific help from the National Academy of Sciences, The Academy
had been incorporated by an Act of Congress in 1863 to act in an
advisory capacity to the government on scientific matters. The
Navy in its haste to clothe its ships with iron during the preceding
war years had neglected to compensate the ship's compasses properly.
It was mainly to the correction of these ships" compasses that the
gentlemen of the Academy addressed themselves. The seed was sown,
however, the Navy could and would call on the outside scientific
community to help solve its operational problems.
Toward the end of the 19th century and in the beginning of this
century the Navy became much more conscious of the role of science,
not only in the form of weapons technology but also in considering
the conduct of war. This was a result of the scientifically-educated
Naval Academy officers reaching the top of their profession. Several
of these men were remarkable and are worthy of mention in the his-
tory of operations research in the Navy.
Admiral Stephen Luce headed a Board which in 1884 effected the
establishment of the Naval War College at Newport, R„I, His con-
cept of the curriculum included courses in international law, math-
ematics
,
languages, astronomy and hydrography. (The technical
portion of the curriculum was taken over by the U.S. Naval Post-
graduate School in 1909.) Its main purpose, however, was the
"systematic study of military operations by land or sea, applying the
experiences of history to contemporary conditions and to the particular
2
theaters in which the nation may be interested."
Rear Admiral Mahan was one of the first instructors at the War
College, It was his writing that convinced Navies throughout the
world that Naval warfare was a subject to be studied and analysed and
that lessons could be learned by studying of History (Past Operational
Data),
Rear Admirals Luce and Mahan in effect were advocating and con-
ducting operations research for they were studying and using operation-
al data in a scientific manner in order to increase the effectiveness
of an operation f in this case the operation was the projection of sea
power.
A third officer , Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, who was several
years junior to Admiral Luce instituted many technical changes in the
Navy during his long career and was a champion of the scientific
approach to war„ It was Admiral Fiske who, as senior aide to Sec-
retary of the Navy Josephus Daniels proposed and obtained the estab-
lishment of the office of Chief of Naval Operations in 1914, For
the first time there was one officer who was responsible for the
operation of the Navy and the efficiency of the fleet. It was under
this officer that the study of Operations naturally fell and has
principally continued until this day.
CHAPTER II
THE NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES
Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels and Admiral Fiske disagreed
sharply on the efficiency of the Navy and its state of readiness for
war. Admiral Fiske was retired and later reprimanded for his con-
tinued insistance that the Navy was not ready to face the war that
was raging in Europe. By July of 1915, however, Mr. Daniels did feel
that the Navy needed some help from the civilian scientific community
„
At that time he stated in a letter to the famous Mr. T. A. Edison that
the Navy had no organization that was set up to devise "new things"
or to perfect the naturally inventive ideas of the American people.
He therefore asked Mr. Edison if he would be willing to head a board
that would advise the Navy and correct this deficiency. Mr. Edison
accepted and Secretary Daniels then wrote to the secretaries of the
11 largest engineering societies in the United States asking that
they each propose 2 men to be members of the board headed by Mr.
Edison. This maneuver assured the board an interdisciplinary
character which we will see came to be one of the hallmarks of an
operations research group. All perspective members of the board
agreed to serve without pay , a feat which more recent secretaries
have not been able to reproduce.
The first meeting was held on October 7\ 1915. Although Mr.
Edison was elected as Chairman he did not act as the chief executive
officer because it had been understood between Mr. Edison and Sec-
retary Daniels that it was his inventive talent that was wanted
and not his administrative and executive ability. It was also decided
that the board should be called The Naval Consulting Board of the United
States, It is a shame that the words "Operations Research" did not exist
in the scientific vocabulary of the time because as we shall see a title
using them would be much more appropriate to describe the work that the
Consulting Board was to do.
At a meeting on November 4, 1915 at India House, New York (which
this writer remembers as having an adequately stocked bar) it was de-











Production, Organization, Manufacture and Standardization
Ship Construction
Steam Engineering and Ship Propulsion
Lifesaving Appliances
Aids to Navigation
Public Works s Yards and Docks
Many members were on several committees.
In spite of the sound advice of Sir Issac Newton quoted in
Chapter I, Secretary Daniels decided to attach the Naval Consulting
Board to his office rather than to the office of the Chief of Naval
Operations. In other words the Consulting Board was not really a
group of "scientists at the operational level „"
One of the first problems with which the Board came to grips was
the organization of industry for the impending war. The Board
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realized that the country had tremendous industrial potential but no one
was sure of who could and would produce what in a wartime economy and
industry itself suffered from a lack of uniform engineering specifi-
cations. The Board took "inventory" of industry, drew up tentative
war production proposals ? and set forth a standard set of specifications
that industry would have to meet in the manufacture of many items.
This made it possible., for example^ for one company to have to make
only several different types of metal tubing rather than the myriad
formerly required to fit in non-standardized similar products of its
different customer companies. This not only reduced the different
number of repair items needed to be kept on the shelf but also saved
industry millions of dollars in the purchase of component parts
On the 29th of August, 1916 the Congress finally legalized the
Naval Consulting Board of the United States and allowed it a budget of
$25,000 per annum.
At this time the Navy was struggling with the problems of whether
or not to oil-fire naval vessels given the limited supply of oil in
the world. The Consulting Board pointed out that more oil might be
discovered and that even if it were not the tactical advantages of
oil-firing ships were so great that the Navy could not afford to con-
tinue with coal -fed boilers.
Many other problems of a technical nature were considered during
the period of the Board's life. Several examples are; extensive work
on underwater sound apparatus,, proposed work on machinegun sights,
better optics for range finders, We, however s are more interested
in the deliberations of the Board which we would call operations
research.
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In the summer of 1917 Mr. Edison went to Washington to study the
sinking of allied vessels by submarines,, He hoped that there he would
find adequate data on sinkings. This data did not exist in a neat col-
lected form so Mr. Edison and his assistants had to organize and prepare
for display the existing data 9 i.e. to develop their data base.
After compiling the data on coastal shipping and studying it
Mr. Edison found that only 6% of the merchant vessel sinkings had
occurred at night, and that the ship owners and masters had been sailing
their vessels over the same coastal routes that had been used before the
war. Furthermore it was evident that in spite of their losses they were
11
not changing their pattern of operations.
Once he had determined these facts Mr. Edison developed a plan to
correct the situation. This plan was as follows, merchant vessels
should travel in the danger zone only at night; they should take routes
that were different from their previous ones, during the day ships
should anchor in protected shallow water ports so that the submerged
submarines could not approach them. At nightfall the ships were to
get underway and head for their next days anchorage along the coast
12
on the way to their ultimate destination.
In the presentation of his conclusions Mr. Edison made a chart
indicating the shipping flow from French and British ports for a pre-
vious year. He then plotted all the harbors that had shallow water
and were well protected. In this manner he indicated the routes and
13
stop-over ports that would make his proposed plan usable.
The above results were submitted to the Secretary of the Navy,
and were probably forwarded to the Admiralty in London. Unfortunately
12
there is little indication that the recommendations of the report were
14
ever used.
After submitting this report in November 191
7
S Mr. Edison submitted
a similar one on U.S. Coastal Shipping in December 1917, In order to
complete this he had to obtain his own data on shipping. He did this
with the aid of harbor masters , customs officials and similar groups.
In his study of convoy routing and methods of avoiding detection
Mr. Edison made use of simulation techniques and a "definite range
law", both of which are recognized today as operations research tools.
Mr. Edison also made a pegged board covering a chart of
the channels and coasts of England, Ireland and Scotland.
This chart was laid in squares of 40 miles each^ which is
approximately the visibility of smoke from a cargo boat
as seen from a submarine in the center of the square. Each
square was provided with a peg and a peg hole. One person
had the problem of taking into British or French ports, say
30 vessels. His opponent had a similar pegged board with
13 pegs representing submarines. The first player routed
his ships to the various ports at various hours , while his
opponent placed his submarines at points where he thought
most likely a vessel would come into his visible area,
which was then considered sunk. It was found that by fol-
lowing certain methods these 30 vessels could be brought
into port with a surprisingly small number having been
seen by the submarineJ 5
Mr. Edison worked on the problem of convoy zigzag maneuvers. His
conclusions were that for convoys travelling at less than 10 KTS,
(not unusual in those times s or even during WWII), zigzagging was
useless^ in fact even harmful. Mr. Edison said that it was harmful
recognizing that the true measure of effectiveness was cargo carrying
capacity and that zigzagging at slow speed led only to a loss of our
total cargo carrying capacity by lengthening the duration of the
voyage.
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The above problems are operational problems, operational data was
operated on i n a scientific manner in order to minimize the number of
ships sunk in one case, and to maximize the cargo carried in the other..
Thus Mr Edison's work qualifies as operations research.
What was the outcome of all of this?*
It was surprisingly little and this is probably because the
Edision Board was a civilian board advising a civilian, the Secretary
of the Navy. Had the board been at the operational level perhaps more
of the Board's O.R. results would have been used by the operational
commanders and tangible success would have led to the continuance of
the Board after World War I
* Even 50 years later the following quote leaves one wondering about
what might have been in the mill. "Everyone expected that the Board
would evolve some invention that would conquer the Central Powers with
one fell swoop, and had the War lasted another year an important and
confidential device not discussed herein would probably have justified
16
this in a degree at least."
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CHAPTER III
THE INTER WAR YEARS
Between the world wars there was little work that could be char-
acterized as operations research in the U.S. Navy, During these years
the scientific analysis and evaluation for the Navy was conducted by
Naval Officers with scientific talent. Three such men were Admirals
Lee, Parsons and Blandy. (After the war Admiral Blandy was in charge
of the U.S. atomic bomb tests at Bikini.) Their work was handicapped
by two considerations;: first, they had no outside help so that their
work was limited by their abilities and backgrounds; secondly , normal
17
career patterns often interrupted their work. This state of affairs
continued until after the United States entry into the war in 1941.
Meanwhile in Europe and particularly in England during the late
thirties modern operations research was beginning to take shape. At
the urging of A. P. Rowe and Wing Commander Hart, RAF s an operations
research group was set up within Fighter Command. One of the first
problems attacked was the production of a total air defense plan for
the British Isles with particular regard to the best utilization of
the newly commissioned air defense radar stations. The deliberations
of this and other early groups were so successful that in 1940 de-
mand for them was becoming more widespread.
Professor P. M.S. Blackett of Manchester University, later a
Nobel Laureate, and a former Naval Officer gathered together a group
to help solve some of the problems encountered in the Anti-aircraft
command. Professor Blackett's work was successful and he later
15
formed a group often referred to as Blackett s Circus, This group
studied many problems for all of the Services. Thus by 1941 all three
Services in the United Kingdom had operations research sections at the
same level.
In 1941 Professor Blackett wrote a paper called "Scientists at
the Operational Level," This paper which explains the purpose and
reason for scientists at the operational level is considered by most
to be the cornerstone and starting point of modern military operations
research. In particular it was responsible for the starting of the
major O.R. group in the U.S. Navy as we shall see in a following
chapter. Because of its importance, "Scientists at the Operational
Level" is included in its entirety in Appendix I.
How the reports of operations research in England and Professor
Blackett's paper reached the United States is not completely clear,
it appears, however,* that it was due in major part to the efforts
of James Conant of Harvard and Shirley Quimby of Columbia University,
both of whom were in England during the early days of operations re-
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search, and both of whom were involved with early operations re-
search in the U.S. Navy.
So far the history of operations research has been traced from
the Third Century B.C until just before the United States entry
into World War II „ At no time, however, has operations research
been concisely defined, By now the reader should have an idea of
the scope of military operations research from studying the methods
16
and goals of early operations research.
Operations research has been defined in many different ways by
many different people. Almost all of the definitions are partially
correct but none of them are complete. Since the science of operations
research has been applied to a continually wider field, so the defini-
tions of operations research have changed and become broader. As the
history of operations research in the Navy unfolds the reader will see
how new sciences and areas of interest have been added to the field of
operations research.
Thus, after finishing this work the reader should have a good idea
of what operations research is even if he is unable to put in very
concise terms. This problem should not distress the reader since even
men who are acknowledged operations researchers don't agree on a single
definition of operations research.
In case the reader still feels uneasy and would like the security
of a written definition, there follows a list of definitions of operat-
ions research, all of which are good,, none of which is complete. They
will suffice » however, especially for the early period of operations
research,
"Operations research can be called the scientific analysis of
problems involving any form of action with a view to making that action
more efficient," James Bready
"Operations research is the art of giving bad answers to problems
to which otherwise worse answers are given," Thomas Saaty
"Past operations are studied to determine the facts; theories are
17
elobrated to explain the facts and theories are used to make predictions
about future operations." Professor P.M„S, Blackett
"Operations research is the study of the optimization of achievement
of the purpose of an organization," Thomas E, Oberbeck
Shakespeare might have been writing about the above definitions,
instead of about a wound, when he wrote in Romeo and Juliet "Tis not
so wide as a church door nor so deep as a well but twill suffice,"
CHAPTER IV
THE FIRST OR GROUP AND ITS ACCOMPLISHMENTS
The underwater mine considered by Naval officers at the beginning
of the Second World War as a purely defensive weapon to be used only in
small doses was later employed in large quantities by another service
under the direction of a Naval officer-scientist, and became one of the
most decisive and effective offensive weapons in the fight against the
Empire of Japan,
It all began in January of 1942 when about 50 scientists started
meeting in seminars at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory„ The seminar was
under the direction of Dr. Ellis A. Johnson, a geophysicist who was
later to become the director of the Army's 0R0. Others in the group
were Thornton L. Page and George Shortley* both of whom later became
assistant directors of 0R0, also James Martin and Dr. L. E. Hoisington.
This group studied the operational problems of offensive mining. Their
first work was the study of operational mining of ports and mine sweep-
ing using war gaming techniques. 2^ With Dr. Johnson's guidance the
group soon began studying all the aspects of mining,, tactical , strategic
and economic. The results produced by this group were so promising
that on 1 March 1942 the group was officially recognized and named the
21
NOL Operations Research Group. Although it was the first group with
the key words "Operations Research" in its title in the U.S. Navy s it
remained unique for only one day as will be seen in the following
chapter.
Dr. Johnson was able to think on a larger scale than most
19
contemporary mine warfare experts ? and it was due to him that the group
expanded its thinking about a few mines laid around a port and started
to study the implications of laying tens of thousands of mines along
22
whole coastlines. In considering all the aspects of mine warfare,
particularly the economic factors, this group was conducting operations
research in a more sweeping manner than would generally be adopted for
10-15 years. At some time during the early days of this group the idea
of laying a mine field around the coast of Japan was brought up over
23
coffee in the cafeteria of the Washington Naval Gun Factory.
The office of the CNO (OPNAV) felt that since this new group was
studying operations it should work for them. In 1942, however, OPNAV
did not have the physical room so 3 as a temporary measure, the NOL
Operations Research Group was transferred to the Bureau of Ordnance,,
Finally in the summer of 1943 the group was transferred to OPNAV and
found its final moorings as a part of the Mine Warfare Section of Base
Maintenance. Throughout the war the group continued to look at mining
problems using OR techniques? particularly in such areas as mine set-
tings, effectiveness and minefield patterns. At first this group was
headed by Prof. Bitter of MIT, then by Shirley Quimby who had helped
bring Operations Research to the United States, and finally by Walter
C. Michaels from, of all places, Bryn Mawr College. After the war
this group atrophied and died. Its tasks were taken over by the
yet- to-be mentioned Operations Evaluation Group and Weapons Systems
Evaluation Group. During its life in OPNAV the remenant of the
earlier NOL group was always a part of the structure that it advised
rather than an outside consulting group, this made it an exception
20
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among Navy wartime operations groups. i n actual fact, this group had
little influence on any of the large operational decisions made during
25
the balance of the war,
Meanwhile in August 1942 Dr. Johnson and George Short ley from the
NOL Operations Research Group donned uniforms and headed for the Pacific
Theater. Dr. Johnson claims that he was invited to get into uniform be-
2fi
cause he was too much of a thorn in the Navy's side as a civilian.
In the Pacific these men were to become customers for some of the earlier
work that they themselves had done at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory.
They became the first strategic OR group in the Pacific, First they
worked for CINCPAC in Hawaii and later in the war CDR. Johnson became
27
Director of Mining for General Curtis Le May's 21st Bomber Command.
In March 1944 a group called the Mine Modification Unit was set
up as part of MINEPAC in Hawaii, This group had many NOL Weapons Ef-
fectiveness experts and helped with on-the-spot problems as well as
relaying information on effectiveness back to NOL and the OPNAV group.
Throughout the balance of the war this group worked on the OR aspects
of mining and served as an advanced technical feedback station to the
continental producers of mines. The Mine Modification Unit also
studied intelligence and past effectiveness of mines, from this data
it made recommendations to the operational commands on settings for
mines to be used against the enemy. At the end of hostilities most
of the members of this group returned to civilian life and the Mine
Modification Unit faded away.
In July 1944 the Allies captured the island of Tinian from the
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Japanese. At last the U.S. had a base from which General Le May s
giant B29s could reach all parts of the Japanese home islands. Now
the plan that had been discussed over coffee in Washington in 1942
could be put into effects The plan was code named Operation Star-
vation; its objective was to destroy the Japanese seaborne trans-
portation network by saturation mining* Dr. Johnson moved to Tinian
in his capacity as mining director for General Le May; close on his
heels came the Mine Modification Unit and the advanced mine assembly
depot from Oahu,
The first task undertaken by Dr, Johnson was a study of the
attrition of the delivery aircraft. At that time bombing raids on
Japan were being conducted from high altitudes and large formations
in daylight. This was producing a loss rate of about 10%. After
studying the statistics Dr* Johnson proposed that mining be con-
ducted by single aircraft flying at night below 5000 feet using
radar navigation. The advantages of this tactic were that bal-
listic drift of the dropped ordnance was lessened, the strain of
formation flying was eliminated; advantage was taken of the
Japanese lack of night fighters and of a radar warning system.
This proposal was submitted to General Le May on 29 January 1945,
Thereafter most of the bombing raids, as well as the minelaying
sorties, were carried out using these tactics. Aircraft losses
28
were reduced to about 1/10 of their former level, (An order of
magnitude improvement is the goal of the Operations Researcher,)
Finally, in March 1945 the mines were ready for laying,
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Between March and August 1945, 12,053 mines were laid in Japanese waters
using less than 6% of the total strength of the 21st Bomber Command
whose primary mission was the bombing of Japan. During this operation
only 15 minelaying aircraft were lost compared to some 606 Japanese
merchant ships sunk ? an exchange ratio of over 40 o l.
The effect of Operation Starvation on Japan was tremendous.
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Figures 1 and 2 show the Japanese sea traffic in March 1945 and
August 1 945 j, i e, before and after the mining campaign,, The width
of the lines is proportional to the daily amount of shipping over the
various sea lanes. It can be seen that after mine laying Japanese



































How did the enemy feel about Operation Starvation?
"The result of B29 mining was so effective against the shipping
that it eventually starved the country,, I think that you probably
could have shortened the war by beginning earlier." Captain Kyuzo
Tamura, UN.
Prince Konoye stated that the mining had results comparable to
31
the total bombing campaign.
The men who planned 9 executed and did much of the technical work
involved in Operation Starvation were, for the most part, alumni of
the original NOL Operations Research Group. Although that group and
all of its offspring did not survive long after the war it was the
first modern operations research group in the Navy> and did supply
much of the talent for the Army°s postwar operations research effort.
Furthermore one of its charter members directed another Service in
one of the most successful campaigns in the Pacific, the conception,
planning and execution of which were all the produce of OR methods.
Finally the work of the original group foreshadowed the strategic
type of OR that has grown up since WWII, first at Rand and then




Eastward bound convoy 0N67 was beating its way towards Halifax at
1730 on February 21 9 1942 when the convoy rescue ship intercepted a
high frequency signal from a transmitting U-boat, The destroyer USS
Ilea was vectored out by the convoy commander to chase down the bearing.
After an hour of search^ in accordance with the standing antisubmarine
doctrine s the Lea was ordered to rejoin. Shortly after the start of
the midwatch the U-boat again made its presence known , this time by
torpedoing two ships si Ihoutted against the full moon. The convoy
continued onward since a change of course could only be ordered by
CNCL Between midnight and 0645 on the 24th of February four more ships
were torpedoed. Later in the day U-boats were sighted on the surface
15 miles ahead of the convoy 8 but instructions forbade prosecution of
contacts at that range. Finally at noon on the 24th the escort Com-
mander sent a message to CNO requesting permission to change the con-
voy "s course 68 . After seven hours delay permission was granted.
Even this radical course change did not shake the trailing U-boats,
Several more U-boats were sighted and attacked, however? none were
sunk. Finally 0N67 reached Halifax, Almost everything had gone
wrong. The prescribed doctrine had not achieved results ? the sonar
had not made contact* depth charge attacks had not borne fruity and
the reliance on CNO for new orders had proven unweildy and res trie-
tive.
Failures of the sort experienced by 0N67 had caused Capt, Robert
B, Carney to write a letter on 27 January 1942 suggesting that an
27
antisubmarine warfare group be established within the Atlantic fleets
"located where the dope can best be collected on the spot while it is
hot, free from any other duties
,
working from practical experience, and
furthering the aims of COMINCH without further cluttering up C0MINCH ! s
own staff .. .oSuch a unit commanded by the right officer would work in
perfect harmony with fleet training and at the same time furnish hot
material for the Atlantic Fleet and its task forces daily engaged in
33
Anti -Submarine Warfare/"
The "right officer" turned out to be Capt. Wilder D. Baker, a
forceful and erudite Kansan of the Naval Academy Class of 1914 and a
destroyer Squadron Commander, The right place was Boston, Captain
Baker had been studying the ASW problem since November 1941 with the
help of four of his squadron staff officers, Finally on 2 March 1942
the ASW study group as recommended by Capt. Carney was formally es=
tablished within the Atlantic Fleet. While Captain Baker was search-
ing for a way in which to attack the ASW problem he came across Pro-
fessor Blackett's famous paper "Scientists at the Operational Level,
This resulted in a request to Dr. John Tate of the National Defense
Research Committee for help in organizing "a group of men of out-
standing reputation with broad vision and receptive minds who would
preserve the atmosphere of scientific research to analyze anti-sub-
35
marine operations. Dr< Tate called on Professor Phillip Morse of
MIT, a physicist who is famous for the Morse Potential in Nuclear
Physics , to form the new ASW group.
In early conversations with Dr. Morse, Capt, Baker states that
28
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he was "in some ways like an infant going to a skilled pediatrician—
I could not describe my symptoms,, but fortunately he was able to diag-
nose some of them and start the treatment."
Professor Morse commenced to recruit other members of the group,
such as George Kimball, and the civilian side of the outfit was placed
under the wing of Columbia University to preserve a certain freedom from
military pressures imagined or real. At first the Group was nicknamed
"Bakers Dozen" although there were only seven scientists in it^ then
the name Operations Research Group for Anti-Submari ne IMprovement was
considered but the acronym proved impolitic. Anti -Submarine Operations
Research Group (ASWORG) was settled on in May 1942. In the meantime
the major part of the Group moved to Washington to be closer to the
headquarters of COMINCH. 35
ASWORG and its lineal descendents have constituted the mainstream
of operations research in the United States Navy from its birth until
the present day, Therefore a large part of the remainder of this paper
will study ASWORG, its descendents mutations , triumphs , failures and
additions through the years.
ASWORG attacked the ASW problem from all sides. It collected com-
bat reports, sifted intel ligence ? looked at equipment and its use, set
up liaison with the British operational research group? and studied the
ASW doctrine. The result was the publication on August 9 9 1942 9 only
9 months after Pearl Harbor of the first manual of standardized ASW
37
search and attack procedures in the U.S. Navy.
ASWORG expanded beyond the original seven scientists. Dr. Morse
and Columbia University recruited members with backgrounds in physics,
29
chemistry,, geology, the insurance industry, mathematics and many other
fields, ASWORG became a truly interdisciplinary study group with mem-
bers chosen for their ability to apply the scientific method rather than
to use a particular scientific tooK Dr, Morse insisted from the begi n-
ning that members should not take credit for combat triumphs that their
studies had helped engineer because they were not making the operation-
. . . .
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al decisions,, This tactic kept ASWORG in the good graces of the op-
erating Navy as much as did the sound advice that was being cranked out
to the operating forces at an ever- increasing rate.
At first ASWORG confined itself to studying ASW problems in the
North Atlantic. One of the first conclusions drawn from operational
data was that the number of ships sunk was independent of the convoy
size. Consequently in 1943 the convoy sizes were greatly increased,
convoys of over 100 ships became the rule rather than the exception.
The overall losses of merchant ships in the Atlantic took a sharp
plunge.
On 5 December 1942 Captain Baker left ASWORG and took command of
the battleship North Carol ijna It had been his work which had cleared
the way for the entry of civilian scientists into the Department of
the Navy. By the time that he left ASWORG was healthy and respected.
In July of 1944 the TENTH FLEET (an administrative organization) was
formed to coordinate ASW operations. ASWORG then consisting of about
40 scientist became an advisory part of this new organization.
As ASWORG was growing it became necessary to send its members
to the field from time to time to gather data. This led to the policy
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of sending representatives to various far flung commands „ At first these
representatives were sent mainly to ASW commands or for liaison with the
British, but as the ASW problem decreased, other operational commanders
began asking for them and for help fft establishing their own operations
research groups. In October 1944 ASWORG was transferred to the readi-
ness division of COMINCH's staff and renamed Operations Research Group
(ORG). ORG was still a civilian group 5 , not under Navy control , but
advising the Navy on operational problems. Unlike ASW0RG 8 ORG addres-
sed itself to the whole spectrum of Naval warfare problems in all
theaterSo The ORG field representatives took on six basic types of
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assignments,
1, Liaison an example of which was the assignment of an ORG
member to British Operational Research Groups.
2, The Staff assignment is one in which the ORG representative
acted as an advisor to a particular staff. He was also used as a col-
lector of data for the parent organization , ORG,
3, The Training type of assignment was when a representative was
assigned to a training command in order to help devise training tech-
niques that would optimize operations performance,
4, Operational assignments were when a representative was as-
signed to advise on a specific operation.
5, Experimental ( operational^ ) assignments were made to units
that were trying to develop better operational procedures by experi-
mentations, e.g.* Ant i = Submarine Development Detachment Atlantic Fleet,
6, Experimental (equipment) assignments were made to keep abreast
of new developments in hardware.
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Each type of representative was sent to help his foster organization
but also acted to keep ORG informed and primed with useful data.
An example of the success of an ASWORG/ORG representative in the
field is the work that finally led to the closing of the Mediterranean to
German U-boats, By the end of 1943 Allied losses in the Atlantic were on
the decrease, however, losses in the Mediterranean were still climbing, Con^
vennonai .^» tactics seemed to have little effect. The ASWORG rep-
resentative to Admiral Hewitt's staff at Casablanca suggested that
Allied forces be concentrated at the Straits of Gibraltar in order to
close the U~boat°s entrance to the Mediterranean, He also proposed
the patrol patterns to be used and acquired the new Magnetic Anomoly
Detectors (MAD) for the theater patrol aircraft. In January of 1944
all was ready* British and American forces were positioned around the
Strait waiting for a U-boat to attempt a transit. The patrol aircraft
began to fly their new barrier patrols «, The destroyers waited to strike.
On February 24 ? U-761 was detected by aircraft and sunk by destroyers
while trying to enter the Strait, and on March 16
s U-392 and U- 731 were
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also sunk. The door had been shut and shipping losses declined,
There were many other tactical areas that were examined and a par-
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tial list might include;
Blockade operations in the South Atlantic (After implementing ORG
designed searches
,
3 blockade runners were caught in 48 hours.)
Development of ship ASw search patterns.
The determination of the best tactics for a surface unit to use
against a Kamikaze attack. (Exactly opposite for small and large ships.)
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Desired accuracy m Naval supporting fire„ The fact that great ac-
curacy was not always necessary led to the development of the highly ef-
fective rocket ships.
Convoy anti-aircraft doctrine was proposed and outlined by Dr. R„F t
Rinehart„
The determination as to whether the Germans had developed counter-
measures to our radars was highly important. By analizing the change
in sighting rates of submarines by aircraft the analysts at ORG were
able to advise the operational commanders whether a countermeasure or
a new enemy tactic was degrading our use of detectors
Study of ship noise to help develop a countermeasure for accoustic
torpedoes. This led to the employment of foxer gear.
This list could go on and on ; however 3 it is sufficient to indicate
that the studies led to enough good results that by the end of the war
the operating Navy was impressed with the fact that operations research
should be continued in peacetime Bakers Dozen which had started with
seven scientists working on ASW problems in Boston, was now a group of
73 and had representatives all over the world studying almost all types
of Navy operational problems,, Columbia University was no longer the
parent of ORG, The contract was now handled through the Office of
Field Services of the Office of Scientific Research and Development
„
The annual cost was a comparatively miniscule $800 ? 000 ? probably pro-
viding one of the best cost-ef fecti veness ratios on the market at that
time.
In the summer of 1945 the Navy was thinking about its structure
in peacetime. The Operations Research Group was not left out of this
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thinking as is evidenced in a letter of 19 August 1945 from Fleet Admiral
E„ J King to the Secretary of the Navy recommending continuation of ORG
in the postwar organization. (See Appendix II ),
It is not always best to first evaluate new tactics in the heat of
actual battle where mistakes often cost lives and can cuase a change in
the tide of war. Knowing this, and possibly not trusting all the recom-
mendations of ASWORG/ORG completely, the An ti -Submarine Development in
the Atlantic (ASDEVLANT) unit was created. The purpose of this unit was
to test some of the new tactics and often to generate data that could
not be obtained in the heat of battle* A sister organization, Surface
Anti -Submarine Development in the Atlantic (SURASDEVLANT) soon arrived
on the scene These two units were indispensible to the operations of
ASWORG/ORGo Their importance was recognized, and after the war, Admiral
King decreed that a new unit, the Operational Development Force (OPDEVFOR)
should be set up a Instead of generating data on just ASW operations
OPDEVFOR (later OPTEVFOR) would be set up to test all kinds of equip-
ment and tactics f nautical as well as aerial. This organization has
continued almost unchanged up to the present 5 and continues to be a
major source of data for various Navy OR groups
„
Admiral E J King? in his final formal report to the Secretary of
the Navy
s which was in effect a report on all U S« Navy endeavours dur-
ing the latter part of the war, dealt with OR at length. He stated
that the complexity of modern warfare made it necessary that scientific
methods be used not only m the production of machinery but also in the
direction of war. He continued
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The application, by qualified scientists, of the scientific
method to the improvement of naval operating techniques and
material, has come to be called operations research. Scien-
tists engaged in operations research are experts who advise
that part of the Navy which is using the weapons and craft--
the fleets themselves. To function effectively they must
work under the direction of
g ,
and have close personal con-
tact with j, the officers who plan and carry on the operations
of war.
^
Admiral King then went on to tell the Secretary that the Navy had
an operations research group,, He said that OR work had fallen into two
main categories , one of which was the analysis of warfare from a purely
theoretical poi nt-of-view and the other being the analysis of operation-
al data. The changes that these studies had caused in operational pro-
cedures had often increased our effectiveness by three or four times.
Admiral King continued to point out some of the more startling successes
and ended with the following paragraph. "The Operations Research Group,
to be renamed the Operations Evaluation Group as more closely descriptive
of its function , will be continued as a part of the naval organization at
appropriate peacetime level."
In those days the CNO informed the Secretary of what he had done and
sould do. It is somewhat ironic that this method of establishment if OEG
and control of the Navy was laid to rest several years later by the ar-
rival of a group of men in the Department of Defense whose main manage-




At the end of hostilities Profo Morse returned to MIT. The Navy,
however, seemed loath to let him rest in peace. Partly because of Prof..
Morse , the Navy approached MIT with the proposal that it take over the
management of the Operations Evaluation Group (OEG), It is a safe as-
sumption that Prof Morse played a major role in persuading MIT to take
on the contract.
On 1 November 1945 the contact was closed. The purpose of the group,
as stated in the contract t was to provide liaison between the operating
fleets and the research and evelopment laboratories, and to conduct
studies for the Deputy CNO (Fleet Operations and Readiness) on the
following subjects.
1„ Analysis of past operations
„
2. Analysis of the degree to which new equipment meets military
requirements.
3. New tactical doctrine based on the above subjects.
4. Formulation of new requirements,
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5. Analytical study of strategic requirements,
Although the group was to report to the office of the CNO, the Office
of Naval Research paid for the contract This weird arrangement came
about because OPNAV has no contract fund allotted to it for research and
development. Although ONR paid the fiddler it was unable to call the
tune. OEG worked for and advised the operational side of the Navy
rather than its research branch. MIT did not want a political change
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or a similar event to leave it high and dry without a contract. MIT also
felt ? rightly, that if OEG were established on a year by year basis 9 re-
cruiting would be difficult. To allay these fears MIT was given a 3 year
"forward funded" contract for $375 ,,000 per annum.
Shortly after the contract was signed separate correspondence es-
tablished a provision for members of the group to take academic leave.
This made OEG much more competitive in obtaining scientists. In the
postwar years » 20% of the OEG staff were authorized to be on academic
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leave at one time, however the actual figure remained about 5%.
The advantages that the Navy obtained with this contract were many:
it permitted members of OEG to maintain their academic ties and aided
in the recruiting of new members, it offered the chance to tap the great
intellectual potential of the Institute in times of need, the concept
of the scientist away from the pressures and restrictions of the mili-
tary was maintained. (Whether these pressures exist and are stifling
is not important here, but the fact that most civilians believe that
they do exist is important.) Finally ? the Navy had s via this contract^
the political asset of an unbiased scientific advisory group backed by
one of the greatest colleges in the country.
What MIT gained from managing a group in Washington ? 500 miles
from the banks of the Charles
,
is hard to say^ and it appears that MIT
at times wondered why it had this strange bedfellow. Nevertheless^
the contract was signed.
During the pre-Korea period the group was made up of about 30
scientists and was quartered in the Pentagon which led to constant
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worries about eviction and moves. Approximately one-fifth of the members
were on field assignment and one-fourth of them were assigned to the
Scientific Analysis Section (S/A)„ S/A was a subgroup of OEG whose
purpose was to provide analytical assistance to any desk in OPNAV that
might request it. They were in effect OPNAV s private pool of field
representatives , and many of the "shops" in OPNAV did and still do take
advantage of their talents. The remainder were part of the main body or
on leave. See Appendix III,
The group was controlled by a Director who was responsible to the
Navy for its performance. He was aided by an Assistant Director and a
number of "project leaders." The OEG continued on in this manner, ex-
panding as such groups will, until the beginning of the Korean War,
1946 was spent recapitulating what had happened in the tumultuous
preceding five years. Reports on major areas were issued, An example
of this was Anti -Submarine Warfare in World War II (a historical
account of the Anti -Submarine war 5 examining the tactics used and their
effectiveness.) Two reports of lasting importance were published;
Methods of Operations Research by Morse and Kimball, outlined some of
the OR methods used during the war. This book has been used effect-
ively as an introductory textbook ever since
;
and the methods pre-
sented in it are still valid and applicable. Many of these methods
and techniques were either new or had not been applied to operational
problems before. Before long? many people began to think of operations
researchers as people who applied these tools and methods to problems,
for example almost any work that was based on probability or statis-
tics was in danger of being called operations research, The same
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applied to many other methods such as gaming. This is a much more re-
strictive definition of OR than those previously discussed and therefore
will be rejected as insufficient* Even today, however, there continues
to be a large number of misinformed people who define OR by the tools
used in the investigation of the problem. Koopman's Search and Screening
which outlined some of the search theory developed during the war has
been a starting point for most of modern search theory „ In fact in many
sub areas of search theory it is still the best text available. In 1946
OEG also published 55 studies dealing with specific tactical or theoret-
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ical problems^ e.g. Zig-Zag Plans., These works „ expounding lessons
learned during the war, were not the only ones that were done within the
naval establishment in 1946 but they were among the best and were about
the only ones that were produced using a scientific method, i.e. opera-
tions research.
By 1947 the analysis of World War II was nearly finished and what
remained could be left to the memoir writers. Since there was no war-
time pressure to work on specific problems and come up with "quick
fixes" OEG was at leisure to examine the broader aspect of naval policy.
Much of its work was of a strategic nature rather than tactical. It
had become obvious that the identification of the measure of effective-
ness of an operation was one that often needed a strategic outlook.
During the war ASWORG had studied the ASW problem from the point
of view of how to sink the most submarines. In calmer postwar re=
flection it seemed as though this might not be the real measure of
effectiveness. OEG began to study the whole arena of war at sea and
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found that instead of submarines sunk, tons of cargo deli vered/ti me
;
might be a good measure, (Mr, Edison had reached the same conclusion
30 years previously,) Therefore, in order to increase effectiveness
it might be better to reduce the turnaround time of the ships
,
or to
decrease their passage time* rather than to expend so much effort
sinking submarines. Many measures were considered and various trade
off analyses were conducted. After working on the problem OEG de-
cided that it was merely a subset of a larger problem which involved
other threats to shipping such as mines and aircraft. Just prior to
the Korean war the group summarized its findings on the problem in a
report % Measures for the Protection of 0ver^seas_ Transport, This re-
port tried to set up a rational ordering of R and D programs and to
call attention to gaps or inequities in existing programs
.
Although OEG was not the only Navy group conducting what could be
classified as OR during this period it was the only one whose chartered
purpose,, methods and results made 1 1 an OR Group, Any operations re-
search conducted in the Navy outside OEG was done by mistake, or on
a yery mtermittant basis , or in name only because a parent organiza-
tion thought that it should have an OR Group, There were no lasting
results from other groups which have been handed down and are clearly




The start of the Korean war changed the leisurely atmosphere at
OEG to one more in keeping with the emergency on hand. Academic
leaves were cancelled. The recruiting effort was increased. The
trends towards the study of long-range broad-scope problems were
reversed. The research program was redirected towards solving the
urgent problems related to the war
The commanders in the field began calling for OEG help almost
as soon as the war began,. The field representative system^ which
had been so successful in World War II S was reinsti tuted. During
the Korean war there were 6-8 analysts seconded to the operational
commanders at all times, and in Hawaii there was a miniature
evaluation group of three men attached to CINCPACFLT Staff,
Although OEG was ready and able to send analysts to the oper-
ational commands f and it was probably the best usage for them-
their departure caused problems for the central group. Before the
war had broken out OEG had settled down to a fairly well laid out
research program,, With analysts being continually rotated to the
field this program was nearly impossible to follow particularly
because no man could count on finishing a project that he had
started. With much of its talent scattered about the Pacific OEG
was not always able to put the best men to work on a poject in
Washington, Not the least of the organizational problems caused
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by the war was that the rotation and field assignments caused more than
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one member to leave the group for a less strenuous existence.
In Korea one member of the group was killed when the aircraft
in which he was flymg crashed in enemy territory. Tragedy that
this was, it was probably a lesser one than letting the analyst fall
into enemy hands. Because the analyst must be able to see his problem
in the proper context, he must have facts relating to many sensitive
fields. His capture would have provided enemy intelligence with a
windfall. From that time on OEG did not allow its representatives to
so jeopordize themselves or their country.
Administratively OEG had little trouble taking the wartime ex-
pansion and change of pace in its stride 5 and its organization re-
mained essentially the same until the end of the war,
Korea was the first time that the Navy used its aircraft pre=
dominately for supporting our forces in combat ashore. The chance
to document and analyze this type of employment for naval aviation
was to prove invaluable in later years.
In general OEG's work fell into two categories during this
period;
1. Tactical problems such as. choice of weapons for naval
attack aircraft.
close ai r support,
naval gunfire support:
2. Strategic problems such as - blockade tactics, their use and
efficiency.
interdiction of land transpor-
tation.
Statistical Aspects of Port Operations was a study published
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after analysing the wartime operation of the port of Yokohama. The
study made use of a class of new methods which have now been collected
under the title of Queuing Theory,, The report recommended that the
number of berths vacant be increased in order to decrease the turn
around time of an arriving merchantman. The technique was tried and
dramatic results were obtained in increasing the flow of shipping
through Far East ports. Even more importantly this paper pointed the
way towards practical uses of Queuing Theory in other areas of
operations such as communications networks , air defence systems s etc„
During this period another technique that was used more widely
than before was Gaming. Solutions to problems such as the optimization
of armament for fighter bomber duels, design of minefields and optimal
mine countermeasures were obtained using Game Theory, Sequential
analysis was used in studying network or flow type problems.
By the end of the Korean war the group had grown in size?, in-
fluence and prestige. Its morale was high and it had demonstrated
that it could respond to an emergency, Equally as important , there
were several new and powerful tools in its bag of tricks and it had
some fresh combat data with which to work which might be usable in
proving the Navy's case that modern warfare had not made the Navy a




The period from the end of the Korean war until the early 60s
was one of great expansion of the operations research in the Navy,
Possibly even more important from a scholastic point of view was
that the science of operations research began to change and evolve
toward its present form^ i.e.? a science that incorporates economics
to a large degree and looks at strategic problems as well as tactical
ones. The great expansion mentioned above can be attributed to many
factors. Officers assuming higher command had seen OR at work for
more than a decade and were impressed, Some of the early luminaries
in the field were now in positions of great power 5 e.g., Admiral
Robert B. Carney was CNO. Russia s entry into the nuclear "club 1
made national defense extremely expensive; and it was imperative
not to make costly mistakes using the old trial and error methods
of decision making. Competition for money from other services who
had answers provided by OR organizations such as Rand had to be
countered. Operations research became "fashionable' and many
organizations felt that they had not arrived unless their lily was
gi Ided by an OR group.
This factor caused a major personnel problem for 0EG c So
many commands and even the Department of Defense were asking for
field representatives that OEG became somewhat unstable. Moreover,
some of the scientists did not like the constant rotation and con-
sequently left the group.
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The Office of Naval Research was at a loss to understand why it was
not deeply entrenched in the field of operations research. Early in 1953
ONR made a move to correct this seeming deficiency in its own organization by
asking MIT to conduct an operations research program for ONR, MIT was un-
willing to set up a separate group in Washington and since MIT had always
been uneasy in its partnership with the Navy it was reluctant to take on
the job in any form. In the end MIT's objections were beaten down and
in June 1953 a contract was drawn up whereby scientists from OEG would
be rotated to a group at ONR for work on problems generated by ONR,
This group was called the Operations Research Group (ORG) and was es-
tablished in ramshackle WWII temporary buildings, ORG eventually ex-
panded to a staff of 8 men (see Appendix III), however, their achieve-
ments were never momentous. From the start in 1953 there was trouble
between ONR and MIT/OEG, It seems that ONR had a tendency to interfere
with both the administration of the group and in the actual work of the
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scientists, Simultaneous with the establishment of ORG was the for-
mation of a small group in OEG whose purpose was to keep track of Navy
expenditures. This R and D review section was eventually transferred
to ORG where it continued to turn out useful reports that indicated
to OEG and ONR exactly where the Navy was spending its money, con=
sequently implying the current value that the Navy was putting on
various projects. By comparing these statistics with its own findings,,
as to where effort (money) should be applied, OEG was able to tell
whether the Navy's present investments were being made in the most
beneficial manner.
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As the strains between OEG and ONR became more intense the morale of
ORG dropped ORG was moved to sumptuous new quarters
,
with little effect
on morale, The scientists were not given properly challenging problems
and there was even some pettiness in ONR s application of pressure
which involved withholding of needed documents from OEG. Finally
MIT/OEG decided that it must all end. Consequently the contract was
ended on April 30 f, 1957„ The R and D review section continued for
another nine months, however The parting of ways was by no means com-
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pletely harmonious.
There were few noteworthy results from ORG during its short life
;
but its existence did have several effects First; it incurred a
certain rivalry between OEG and its exchequer, ONR, which was neither
helpful or seemly; secondly, it strained the relations between OEG and
its parent organization, MIT
In the post-Korea fight for the budget the Navy s chief competitor
often had studies conducted by the Rand Corporation to back Us posi-
tionSo Naturally there arose a clamor, both from within and outside
the Navy, to set up an organization similar to Rand for the Navy,
The Navy approached this problem by appointing an ad hoc committee
within OPNAV to study the situation. This committee recommended that
a new desk in OPNAV be set up to study Navy long-range requirements.
Early in 1955 the CNO, Adm, Robert B. Carney ; created the Long Range
Object' ves Group (OP 93) to be headed by Radm, (later Admiral)
Gnff in, its functions were to study subjects of interest to the
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Navy 10- 15 years m the future, including
a) the responsibilities of the Navy
46
b) the tasks that must be performed to carry out those re-
sponsi bill ties,
c) the effect of world technology as effecting the performance
of these tasks,
d) the capabilities required to perform these tasks.
e) the optimum weapons systems and techniques for achieving
these capabilities, and their adaptability to and effects on estab-
lished strategic concepts,
f) required composition of forces,
OP 93 was, in addition, authorized to acquire civilian scientists
to help it in its broad task. The charter of OEG was sufficiently broad
to qualify it to help on these problems. (See Appendix IV), However*
there was much pressure against employing OEG. The reasons for this
were many and varied^ however the major ones were many people in the
Navy felt that OEG was good at small scale problems but was not neces-
sarily replete with titanic strategic thinkers, OEG was too often
subject to pressure from the Navy and this pressure would be ruinous
to the sober reflection for which the Navy was searching,
MIT was again approached and asked to set up a separate organi-
zation in Washington to help OP 93„ This MIT refused to do. Two
separate organizations in Washington were more than even MIT could
manage. Finally MIT/OEG agreed to set up several scientists taken
from OEG as a group called the Naval Warfare Analysis Group (NAVWAG)
(See Appendix V). This group would be managed by the Director of
OEG but treated as a separate entity or division, It was hoped that
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this might somewhat impede the expected rush by OEG scientists to join
the new group studying the ''Big Picture." The contract was signed on
30 December 1955 with funding of $35 , 000 for 6 months which was soon
found to be grossly inadequate. Through its early years NAVWAG had
many administrative difficulties mostly caused by inadequate funding
arrangements with 0NR e However, it continued to grow and fill a need.
OP 93 became a place for rising stars, successful alumn 1 include Adms,
Griffin, Rivero and Ricketts. This was no small factor in increasing
the interest of Naval officers in OR,
Although OP 93 and NAVWAG were supposed to study long-range
problems their physical situation in Washington and their abilities
eventually drew them into the position of helping solve any of the
short-range problems which crop up so frequently in Washington. In
1958 the question of the usefulness of aircraft earners was becoming
more and more interesting to the Air Force and even to the Polaris
oriented Naval Officers . 0P93/NAVWAG did not have the answers to many
of their questions, therefore. Secretary of the Navy Gates wrote to
the Naval Research Advisory Committee asking for help with this
problem, and also for suggestions as to what the Navy sho^d do to
be better prepared to answer probing questions on long-range matters
.
Dr c C,Go Suits, Chairman of NRAC and a Vice-President of G=E, ; sug-
gested that the Navy set up an organization to take over the long-
range studies assigned to NAVWAG and that NAVWAG concentrate on
50
the mid^ange situation,, Secretary Gates turned the problem and
recommendations over to the CN0, Admiral Burke sent out orders to
have Radrru Hooper flown back from his command in the Carribbean to
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head a new group. He then gave Adrru Hooper almost a blank cheque in the
foundation of this group % but insisted that it be set up away from the
pressures of Washington in order that it would not get mired down as
had NAVWAG,
Adm. Hooper sequestered himself at the War College at Newport^
Rhode Islands He took with him a half a dozen young Naval Officers
and an international relations expert. Prof, Reitzel. The group was
formalized on 31 March 1959 and was christened the Naval Long Range
Studies Project (NLRSP). For almost a year nothing was heard from
NLRSP, Finally its first study was completed, Long Range Estimate
of the Si tuati on was a book of about 200 pages which attempted to
describe the world situation m 1975. All in all it was good work.
It predicted the splitting of the USSR and China ? and the polarization
of NATO around France and the United Kingdom.
In 1961 NLRSP was reorganized^ renamed and relocated. In Cambridge
Mass,, the new Institute of Naval Studies (INS) began to take on a more
academic flavor than it had as NLRSP in Newport* The ratio of civilians
to Naval Officers increased steadily
s
and management was eventually
contracted out to the Institute of Defense Analysis, There was also
a change in the type of problems studied. They were less of the
social , economic and political nature and more of the technical type.




Lobby , Vincent Davis states;
Some officers thought that one particular civilian em-
ployee of the Navy Department was a powerful empire
builder who had managed to undermine the important
original functions of NLRSP in his dual capacity as
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the director of two key agencies; the Naval Warfare
Analysis Group (NAVWAG) and the Operations Evaluation
Group (OEG). 5 I
In June of 1958 OEG set up a new branch called the Applied Science
Division (ASD) in Cambridge, Mass. Its stated purpose was to monitor
upcoming developments in science
s,
particularly from a technological
point of view ? and to report on their implications to the Navy„ In
fact another major reason for its establishment was to allow the
scientists rotated to ASD to have a chance to mingle in an academic
atmosphere for the duration of their tour. The Navy, however, ended
all this when early in 1962 it directed OEG no longer to consider ASD
as one of its field activities but belonging to INS. This was not
such a great change because shortly thereafter INS merged into the
OEG structure as will be seen in the next chapter. The use of ASD
as a point of contact with academe, however , was terminated in this
move. At its peak strength ASD consisted of 20 OEG scientists.
In 1952 at the Tenth Decimal Conference , Deputy Director of
OEG, Dr. M. L. Ernsts stated "In equipment requirements we are in-
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terested in making the most of our limited budgets. Since that
time costing had become much more important even when equipment is
not being considered. There was a large and powerful segment of
the extra Navy OR community that felt that most things in life could
be made commensurable to dollars by some means. This group s center
was at Rand. Throughout the years when OEG had needed an economist
they had hired one on a temporary basis. By the end of the fifties
this appeared to be a very unsatisfactory way of doing business. A
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short term economist never got the feel of the true nature of OR, and
with the trend towards more and more costing OEG had a almost continual
string of temporary economists. For some time OEG sought a permanent
economist, finally after a decision was made to set up a separate
economics branch Dr c Enke (ex Rand, as were most good costing men)
was hired, Thus in January of 1960 the new economics branch was es-
tablished. OEG had acted none too soon. Within a year Robert S 8
McNamara would be Secretary of Defense and every bit of costing ability
that the Navy had would be sorely needed. This particular branch con-
tinued and expanded until 1963 when it was incorporated into NAVWAG.
(See Appendi x III )„
From time to time in the past OEG had called on outside consul-
tants , mostly ex OEG members 9 to help with specific problems. There
were rarely more than 2 or 3 employed at any one time. Early in 1960
OEG changed its policy,, A permanent board of 110 consultants was set
up. Every effort was made to include the most able and respected men
in science in this group. The purpose was twofold, first; to get good
advice when needed, and secondly, to ease the recruitment problem by
pointing out to younger men that some of the greatest scientists in
the country were affiliated with OEG. This board continued until the
next major reorganization of operations research in the Navy* and it
appears that it fulfilled both of its intended purposes.
By glancing at the chart of Appendix III the reader can quickly
review the major OR efforts in the Navy at the beginning of the 60s.
It looks complicated, and it was. Fortunately, there was little
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duplication of effort,, Truly OR in the Navy had grown like Topsey
and with so many groups it was neanng an unmanageable situation,
This lays the groundwork for the following chapter which deals with




In 1963 the Navy attempted to gain reconsiderations for the building
of a second nuclear aircraft carrier of the Enterprise class. In re-
sponse to the Secretary of the Navy's memorandum on the subject to the
Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara wrote- "I do not feel that the sub-
ject of nuclear propulsion for surface warships has yet been explored
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sufficiently to permit a rational decision!' Furthermore he directed
the Navy to undertake a comprehensive quantitative study of the situation.
Two months later Secretary of the Navy Korth returned his findings. These
met with little more enthusiasm than before. Mr. McNamara "s reply stated
"Your memorandum does not provide me with the information I need in order
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to reach a decision of this important subject.
Obviously the Secretary of Defense was a man with new ideas. It was
confrontations like the one above that had caused the Navy to reevaluate
its decision-making processes. The arrival of the new Secretary of
Defense in 1961 was a traumatic experience for the Navy. No longer
could the CNO march down to Congress and demand a new battleship. The
Secretary desired and demanded that each recommendation and decision
be backed by a thorough scientific and economic investigation that
clearly indicated it to be the best alternative. This was a form of
operations research in that it was optimizing an output for a specified
input. However, since Mr. McNamara *s measure of effectiveness and
inputs were often in units of dollars instead of more nebulous units *
operations research began to evolve into a more economics oriented
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science. Some types of operations research remained essentially the
same s especially in the field of optimal tactics, but those studies
that had significant costing in them (and there was an ever increasing
number of these) came under a new heading. Systems Analysis,
Systems Analysis techniques often deal with broader questions
than do those of classical operations research. Besides costing,
another difference is that a problem studied with these techniques
Is most often looked at as a subsystem of a larger system and the
interation ramifications are analysed. Classical OR might deal with
the problem of optimizing Destroyers ASW search procedures whereas
systems analysis might look at the value of the destroyer as an
ASW System in a war at sea.
After struggling along trying to answer the questions posed by
the office of the Secretary of Defense with help from the hydra
headed OR organization that existed at the beginning of the sixties
the Secretary of the Navy called on the Naval Research Advisory
Committee for advice. Their suggestion was that the Navy make an
effort to consolidate the Naval organizations whose primary purpose
it was to conduct OR and Systems Analysis. The Secretary of the
Navy went about this, as could be expectedj by asking MIT to assume
the management of a merged OEG^INS structure (OEG meaning the com-
posite of its various parts. MIT took advantage of the new move
to retire from the Navy OR picture entirely. It was really more
interested in the technical aspects of research.
As a successor to MIT the Navy selected Franklin Institute of
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Philadelphia. Why was Franklin Institute chosen. According to the
Philadelphia Inquirer of September 20, 1962 and the Philadelphia
Bulletin of October 5, 1962 there were strong implications that there
was questionable conduct by a member of the Secretary of the Navy's
staff. One week he was negotiating a contract for several million
dollars with Franklin Institute and the next week he was a well paid
employee of the Institute. He did not last long, but Franklin In-
stitute remained the contract manager for nearly 5 years.
On March 31, 1962 the contract was signed, Franklin Institute
was to manage a new entity called the Center for Naval Analyses. CNA
was made up of three basic divisions. The first was OEG which con-
tinued to work on the "classical" OR type problems and continued to
supply scientific analysts to OPNAV. OEG began sending representatives
to the Marine Corps on a more formal basis than it had before. These
analysts increased annually in number and worked with the Chief of
Staff for R and D, eventually this effort would grow to a full fledged
division of CNA. Since simulation and the use of digital computers
in general was becoming a very important part of almost all OR work
a computer division of about 12 people was set up to cater to the
needs of all the divisions of CNA. The second division of CNA was
NAVWAG, which split from OEG and became a more independent branch to
study mid-range problems; NAVWAG absorbed the old economics branch
of OEG. The third division of CNA was INS which was still situated
in Cambridge, Mass., and had absorbed the Applied Science Division
of OEG earlier that year. The role of INS was still to study the
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long range situation of the Navy. The OEG branch continued to do most
of its work for OP 03 (Fleet Ops and Readiness) whereas the rest of CNA
responded to the desires of OP 090 (Director of Navy Program Planning.)
CNA was not allowed to generate any work of its own ; but was required
to work only on areas requested by the Navy. Before each fiscal year
began the Management of CNA and various desks in OPNAV as well as ONR
meet to map out the work schedule for the following year. The board
of 110 consultants was abolished. This organization remained stable
for nearly 3 years
In the meantime operations research/systems analysis activities
sprang up throughout the Navy. Mr, McNamara made it clear that the
Department of the Navy had better begin to manage itself using his
methods or else the office of the Secretary of Defense would do it.
Consequently there was a headlong rush at almost all staff levels
to set up operations analysis branches. Many groups and individuals
that were so termed had no idea of what either OR or systems analysis
was or was supposed to be. Nevertheless they persevered* collected
vast amounts of data, a large amount of which was neither reliable
nor pertinent. This collected data was often mangled in a com=
pletely unjustifiable manner and produced a result that was either
obviously wrong or so facile as to make a mockery of the science
of operations research and systems analysis. This headlong rush
into a new field by untrained novices had one \/ery unfortunate
effect: the officer who was at sea sailing a ship was overburdened
by ridiculous demands for data from all quarters; after working hours
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to generate this data there were few tangible good results that could
be seen. This served to create a backlash against OR and systems
analysis that still exists. In many wardrooms the terms OR or SA
will bring forth sneers of derision, however , few officers can say
what either term means or how better decisions should be made without
using techniques similar to those of 0R/SA„ There were and are those
who s not understanding the help that these new methods can bring
them, consider them useless and reducing the importance of the Naval
officer.
The load of studies to be carried became so great that it
could not be adequately dealt with by the Department of the Navy
or by CNAj therefore many of them were contracted out to private
industry Some contracts were let by OPNAV through 0NR» and CNA
even subcontracted some of its work. Most of these private companies
started out in the field with very little experience or facility in
0R„ This is painfully obvious in reading some of the studies done
in the early sixties* The high standards set by Secretary McNamara
and the irresi stable force of economic competition soon led to a
marked improvement. Today some of the finest studies are ones
conducted by private contractors; and most of the poor performers
have been eliminated from the field. Industry's talents are an
essential part of the overall OR effort in the Navy.
Returning to the progress of CNA. CNA and its various divisions
continued to expand until 1965 when another reorganization took place,
The management of CNA felt that a group much like the old ASD should
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be fornied, that is a division that would keep an eye out for upcoming
scientific developments that would affect the Navy. Accordingly, a
new branch was formed called the Systems Evaluation Group, In part
SEG s charter read as follows
. „. initiates and improves methodology, models and data for
the purpose of analytically relating systems performance
characteristics to the systems physical characteristics
and systems cost, .. .maintains liaison with the Navy
laboratories and conducts formally directed studies and
projects with focus primarily on technical issues.
"
The other major change was that the group of analysts seconded to the
Marine Corps was formalized into a division of CNA called the Marine
Corps Operations Analysis Group (MCOAG). MCOAG's charter read "MCOAG
furnishes analytical services for, participates in
s
and contributes
to the overall study effort of the Marine Corps, embracing current,
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midrange, and long range problems."
Although CNA was the main OR/SA organization for the Navy many
of the desks in OPNAV had set up study groups consisting of officers
with formal training, and often the OA trained officers were at CNA
only as a dodge, i.e., the OPNAV staff had already filled all of its
legally allowed billets and needed to put its overage somewhere. In
spite of this the Navy did not have any real "in house" unit capable
of high caliber operations research or systems analysis, and CNA S
though good, had too slow a reaction time to be able to help in
solving the day to day crises that come up in the Pentagon, CNA
and the management of Franklin Institute were often at odds. The
Institute was not really research oriented and rarely saw problems
^n the same light as OEG or the other divisions. It has been said
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that in spite of Franklin Institute rather than because of it» some
good studies were produced by CNA„
The problems with Franklin Institute led the Navy to seek another
contract manager and the lack of an "in house" capability for OR/SA





By 1966 OR/SA had taken root firmly throughout the Defense Establish-
ment. Almost all proposals as well as counter proposals were required to
be backed by a strong quantitative study. The Navy had a capability at
CNA that was qualitatively more than adequate, however its reaction time
was long and there was a finite volume of work that could be done by one
groupo In order to overcome these deficiencies and to help coordinate
OR/SA throughout the Navy the CNO decided to set up a Systems Analysis
Division on his staff„ This division would be able to produce studies
for him on short notice without going outside of the Navy, Radm, Elmo
Zumwalt, a quickly rising star in the Navy, one of the youngest and
most able flag officers was chosen to be Director of this new division
in the fall of 1966 „ The director of the division, the Systems
Analysis Division (OP 96) operates under the Director of Navy Program
Planning (OP 090)„ The analysis capability of OP 96 is normally used
in solving the immediate working problems that face the Navy, Ad-
57
ditionally it has four missions.
1„ To provide the CNO with a systems analysis capability
to evaluate the relative effectiveness of alternatives in programs
and program proposals. To this end, the division analyzes various
force levels t weapons sys terns s personnel and support requirements and
develops criteria for appraising the relative effectiveness of al-
ternatives with respect to these areas. Addi tional ly ; it assists in
the evaluation of programs and proposed changes, the balance of
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individual programs, the overall balance within the total program and
its relation to Navy Plans,
2. To manage the CNO Study Program and to coordinate this
program with other Navy Department study efforts. The Navy Study
Program sets forth specific areas that are to be analyzed and desig-
nates the study group responsible for the effort,, The Study Program
is quite explicit. Each study proposal is identified in the following
manner:
a. By a clear statement of the objectives of the study,
including any questions that must be answered.
b. An estimate of the professional man-years, civilian
and officer, required to attain the study objectives.
c Required study completion date.
do Anticipated use of the study product and the gains
which the Navy can expect to derive from it.
e. Specific identification of the responsible study
group.
3o To review and evaluate study results. Once the Study
Program has been approved, OP- 96 closely monitors study progress.
Five of the six groups with OP-96 are involved with this effort.
The General Purpose Warfare Group (OP-962) has cognizance over
subjects pertaining to surface, sub surface and anti-submarine,
and tactical air warfare. OP-963, the Strategic Warfare Group,
monitors studies relating to strategic offensive and defensive
warfare and chemical, biological, and radiological warfare.
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Studies of support areas, logistics, personnel, and communications,
command control, are the responsibility of the Warfare Support Group,
OP-964. The Military and Political Intelligence Appraisal Group,
0P-965 ? covers studies in the areas of Naval intelligence, relation-
ships with the intelligence community, psychological warfare, sur-
veillance systems (space, surface, and sub-surface), and the relation-
ship of future Navy roles in the world environment. The four monitor-
ing groups receive feedback from studies conducted by CNA from CNO
Project Officers who are assigned to each major study effort. Con-
trolled through the Studies Management Group, OP-966, these officers
provide the link between CNA and 0PNAv\ Their duties include pro-
viding CNA with military advice and guidance concerning Navy policy,
strategic, tactical, and operational concepts as well as advising OP-96
on study progress.
4o To implement studies by CNA for the Director, Navy Program
Planning,, OP-96 serves as a point of contact with CNA : In addition
to the previously mentioned functions of establishing study require-
ments and reviewing intermediate and final reports, OP-96 prepares
the annual Study Program budget estimates for the CNO which includes
the CNA appropriation.
Five of the six major groups with OP-96 have been mentioned
above* The remaining one, the Program Analysis Group (OP-961 )
,
performs internal administrative and liaison duties. It is re-
sponsible for insuring the smooth functioning of the internal OP-96
program management system and its interactions with other OP-96
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groups and OPNAV Force Sponsors „
OP 96 grew quickly, both physically and in influence; by 1968 the
Division had approximately 50 officers assigned as well as another 20
or so working at CNA in the Operations Study Group (Studies Management
Group.
)
The latter part of the sixties saw a dramatic increase in the
number of OR/SA jobs at various operational levels . Many of these
were filled by OR/SA trained officers and some of the larger staffs
made use of the OEG field representative systems „ Most of the work
done by these noncentrali zed groups was OR vice systems analysis, i.e.
their work dealt with tactical problems at the operational level,, The
work of these small groups was significantly better than the work
turned out when the first headlong rush towards OR/SA was made earlier
in the decade. The reasons for this were; the Navy had time to build
up the number of officers trained to conduct OR/SA in a proper manner;
many senior officers were now able to pose their questions in a manner
more amenable to good analysis; the Navy as a whole was feeling more
at ease with the new methods used in OR/SA studies. These operational
groups have contributed significantly to our effort in Viet Nam.
Linear programming has been used for scheduling of replenishments.
Search theory has been used to optimally design patrol craft search
patterns. Regression analysis is used extensively to analyze air-
craft losses. Many more examples can be cited but the important
thing is that these beneficial proposals were made by OR teams in
the field. This resurgence of good 0A at the operational level
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is encouraging, and the high caliber of work being turned out and its
practical significance is convincing many former doubters of the value
of OR/SA.
In spite of the lack of formal ties between the lower staff OR
groups and those in Washington, there is much interchange of ideas
and data, particularly through OEG representatives. In some cases
such as in ASW exercises and missile firings, banks have been created
that collect and store the data for Navy-wide use.
In August 1967 the Navy terminated its contract with Franklin
Institute for the management of CNA and negotiated a new contract
with the University of Rochester. Rochester was more research oriented
than Franklin Institute had been and thus made a better management group
for CNA. Morale at CNA rose quickly since the members were working for
a management that understood their problems and had considerable re-
search talent of its own. Several other changes were made with the
new contract. CNA was allowed to devote 23% of its research towards
Navy oriented projects of its own choosing. This lessened the feeling
that CNA was a puppet on OPNAV's string, especially for the scientists
at CNA.
After the change of management at CNA it was decided to assign
more officers to CNA to participate as active members in the studies
being conducted. Some of these officers act as project managers for
CNO, i.e., monitor and report on the work of CNA S They report to
the Assistant Technical Director, a Naval officer, who reports back
to OP-96. The main reason for their presence however, is to infuse
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some practical experience into the various study groups.
The final change was that a board of overseers was established.
This board is made up of distinguished Naval officers and others who
review CNA s actions periodically. The present organization of CNA
has been built up and explained in the last few chapters. For a re-
view, or possibly for a first enlightenment on the subject, the reader
is encouraged to read Appendices III and VI. Once again it is im-
portant to note that a large amount of good OR/SA work is also done
for the Navy by private industry.
Ever since March of 1942 operations research in the Navy has con-
tinually changed in organization as well as in philosophy. OR as
first practiced was almost entirely the study of tactical or operation-
al problems. As the years went by OR and Systems Analysis began to
merge in definition and the outcome of this merger is a science that
is used to study the broadest strategic concepts as well as operational
problems. Organizationally there is to be a strong trend towards the
Naval officer being a working member of the OR staff whereas at first
OR was conceived of as civilian scientists working at the operational
level. This is a good change provided the officers are fitted for the
work (see educational supplement) and the scientists are in need of
and ready to accept advice from seagoing officers. Undoubtedly
operations research/systems analysis has not reached its final form
in the Navy, if such a form exists. One thing is certain however,
that it is here to stay and that it will make the Navy a stronger
and more effective force than would otherwise be the case.
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SUPPLEMENT I
EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL OFFICERS IN OPERATIONS
RESEARCH/SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
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The role of the naval officer in operations research groups was
generally one of an organizer and liaison man until the early 1950 u s.
This was mainly due to two factors. First the educational background
of regular naval officers did not provide them with the techniques
that seemed to be the most useful in operations research,, Secondly,
the original concept of an OR team was one of ci vi li an scientists
working at the operational level, and some scientists felt that it
should stay that way, ' The reason for this feeling will be discussed
subsequently.
When Admiral Robert B» Carney became CNO in 1 950 j, he recommended
that an OR educational program be established. Admiral Carney had
been one of the leading figures in starting OR in the Navy and had
clear concept of its usefulness as well as a conviction that the
regular naval officer had the ability to operate on an OR team.
It may be that he felt that the increasing scope of problems being
attacked by OR methods might lead to a situation where the OR teams
would be making or recommending tactical decisions without the
benefit of an operational viewpoing This would be doubly dangerous
if the naval officer decision makers did not know or understand the
processes that had led to the recommendation,, As a result of the
CNO's recommendation the Superintendent of the U 8 S Naval Postgraduate
School, Radrn, Herrman, was directed to set up a one year curriculum
in operations research and systems analysis at an appropriate
civilian institution, M„LT. was suggested.
The Superintendent of the UoS. Naval Postgraduate School sounded
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out several civilian universities and met with no success . In December
of 1950, he and the Director of OEG submitted a joint proposal that re-
commended the establishment of a six term curriculum at the Naval Post-
graduate School . After considerable discussion the Chief of Naval
Personnel approved the recommendation with the stipulation that the
curriculum might have to be changed if it proved to be too difficult
for the naval officer who had not specialized in higher mathematics.
The Chief of Naval Personnel was not the only one who had doubts
about the ability of the naval officer in the field of 0R o Dr J,
Steinhardt ? the Director of OEG, felt that the selection process for
naval officers was not necessarily the one that would produce good
operations researchers,, He held that the educational period was too
short and that frequent rotations to sea would not allow them to get
past the apprentice stage. Furthermore he had doubts that naval
officers could be objective in the face of pressure from higher
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commands „ In spite of these reservations the first class of nine
officers commenced the curriculum in August of 1951 „ The course
offered was the first formal course in operations research offered
in the U.S. The curriculum was heavily oriented towards mathematics
and the physical sciences and emphasized the techniques that had been
used successfully in past operations research.
The first class graduated in January of 1953, Based on ex-
perience gained with this class, the Superintendent submitted a
revised eight-term curriculum that led to a MS degree and included
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an "experience tour" with a functioning OR group. Particular improve-
ments in the new curriculum were, (1) the inclusion of thesis work,
(2) a greater coverage of proven OR methods, and (3) inclusion of work
on digital computers.
The Chief of Naval Personnel approved this recommendation and the
new curriculum was implemented in July of 1953, The second class
which consisted of 15 officers was graduated in June of 1954. Since
that time the size of the enrollment has varied from a low of four
in 1957 to a high of one hundred and nineteen in the academic year
1967-1968, Some of these officers have been from the Supply Corps,
Marine Corps, and the ILS, Army, In the meantime the OR/SA department
came into being as a separate entity. The number and variety of
courses offered increased steadily. The curriculum and department
developed a high reputation in professional OR circles , the school
was consequently able to hire and retain a high caliber faculty.
During its second class year the USNA class of 1962 was given
the option of taking a pilot introductory course in OR/SA instead
of a regular operations course. This pilot course was enthusiastical-
ly received by Midshipmen and was offered as a regular elective for
several years. Eventually, the Naval Science Department incorporated
required courses on OR/SA into its curriculum. With the new elective
options at the Naval Academy it is now possible for a Midshipman to
major in OR/SA and after graduation go directly to the Naval Postgraduate
School for one year to get a M,S„ degree. There are many officers,
including the author, who feel that the Navy would be better served
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in the long run if these young men went to sea immediately after grad-
uation from USNA in order to learn something about the Navy.
Through the years the number of billets specifically designated for
OR/SA trained officers has continually increased. Today there are ap-
proximately five hundred such billets. One finds naval officers con-
ducting operations research in many different areas. The following is
a partial list.
a. Research and Development- Naval Ordinance Test Station , Naval
Ordinance laboratory* Naval Air Development Center,
b. Operational Evaluation: Air development squadrons
;
Submarine
and Destroyer Development Groups, Staff Operational Test and
Evaluation Force.
c. Operational Studies^ 0P-96s, operational study group working at
CNA.
d. Design and evaluation of Fleet readiness exercises.
e„ Operational evaluations for operating commanders. CINCPACTFLT,
FMFPAC, etc.
The requirement for OR/SA trained officers continues to grow. In
order to help fill the need a six Quarter Bachelors program has been
established at the Postgraduate School and CNO has directed that when
not on sea tours all OR/SA trained officers are to be employed in their
sub specialty.
The Navy was the first service to establish OR/SA education for its
officers and remains the service with the most officers who have a graduate
education in this field. This situation will most likely continue and
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there is now little disagreement that the Naval Officer's role on an
OR/SA team should be one of a full fledged member,, Therefore it can
be assumed that the educational program for naval officers will con-
tinue and that it will remain essentially similar to the present one.
On the other hand the employment of OR/SA trained officers will prob-
ably continue to expand and their talents will be applied to a con-
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Scientists at the Operational Level
A note prepared by Professor P,M„S, Blackett, F,R,S,, in 1941
1. The object of having scientists in close touch with operations is
to enable operational staffs to obtain scientific advice on those mat-
ters which are not handled by the Service technical establishments
„
Operational staffs provide the scientists with the operational out^
look and data. The scientists apply scientific methods of analysis to
these data, and are thus able to give useful advice.
The main field of their activity is clearly the analysis of actual
operations , using as data the material to be found in an operation
room, e,g, s all signals, track charts % combat reports , meteorological
information, etc.
It will be noted that these data are not, and on secrecy grounds,
cannot, in general, be made available to the technical establishments.
Thus, such scientific analysis, if done at all, must be done in or
near operation rooms.
The work of an Operational Research Section should be carried out
at Commands, Groups, Stations or Squadrons as circumstances dictate,
2. SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONS
To what extent is it useful to do analysis of operations in a
more scientific manner than is done normally by Service specialist
officers?
Experience over many parts of our war efforts has shown that such
analysis can be of the utmost value? and the lack of such analysis
can be disastrous, Probably the main reason why this is so, is that
\/ery many war operations involve considerations with which scientists
are specially trained to compete -, and in which serving officers are
in general not trained. This is especially the case with all those
aspects of operations into which probability considerations and the
theory of errors enter. Serving officers of the highest calibre
are necessarily employed in important executive posts ? and are,
therefore, not available for detailed analytic work*
Schedule of Typical Operational Research
The records of some war operation (e„g, air attacks on U-boats
for the previous six months) are taken as the data. This is ana-
lysed as quantitatively as possible, and the results achieved are
"explained" in the scientific sense, i,e, brought into numerical
relation with the other operational facts and the known performance
of the weapons used. When this has been done, consideration is
given to possible modification of the tactics to improve the
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operational results.
The first step - that of collecting the actual data - is by itself
of enormous importance, for it is not uncommon for operational staffs
to be unacquainted with what is actually being achieved, An Operat-
ional Research Section is not in general concerned with hot news
,
though they should be prepared to so concern themselves if specifical-
ly requested to do so.
On the Validity of Deductions from Observations
A typical problem is as follows, a weapon A is calculated by a
service technical department to be 50 per cent more efficient than a
weapon B, Actual operations over a given period show, say, two
successes for A and four for B, Does this prove that Bis a better
weapon that A?
Such points arise continually and require the highest scientific
judgement to resolve,, In particular a grasp of fluctuation phenomena
(i.e. Poisson's Distribution) is required. If the average number of
hits on some target in a given time is in , then (on certain assumptions)




Value of Scientific Confidence and Numerical Thinking
The scientist in considering an operational problem very often
comes to the conclusion that the common sense view is the correct
one. But he can often back the view by numerical proof, and thus
give added confidence in the tactics employed e
Or when two alternative qualitative views, A is best B is
best\ are in dispute, he can often resolve this numerically into
some such statement as that A is x per cent better than B in
January and y per cent worse in June'.
In fact, the scientist can encourage numerical thinking on
operational matters, and so can help to avoid running the war by
gusts of emotion.
Operational Experiments
Since new weapons and devices are inevitably put into service
relatively untested, the first few months of the use of a new de-
vice must be considered as an extension of its development trials.
An Operational Research Section can function usefully here in a
liaison capacity between the operational staff, the technical
department which produced the device, and the development unit
which tested it.
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Further it is often possible, by collaboration between controllers
and the staff of an Operational Research Section, to arrange operations
on certain occasions so as to obtain data to clarify some doubtful
pointo For instance, the relative merits of different forms of anti-
submarine sweeps by aircraft is a matter of (a) mathematical calcu-
lation, (b) test by actual operations, perhaps over a long period of
ti me „
3, DISTRIBUTION OF REPORTS ON OPERATIONS
One of the functions of an Operational Research Section is clearly
to write periodical reports on various aspects of operations „ Except
when secrecy questions prevent, these should be given a wide circu-
lation, e,g», in the Air Force to squadrons to be read by the aircrews.
In this way* the tactical education of the men on the job can be
raised,
4, OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
One of the most important duties of a Command is to state its re-
quirements for new devices and weapons,, Such requirements are passed,
in general , through a department of a Ministry (which acts partly as
a filter room, partly as a specialised department and party as a
post office) to a Service technical establishment.
The only places in this chain where the real operational facts are
known is at the Command Groups and Stations, Unless the operational
requirement is considered scientifically at the Command jointly by
the operational staffs and scientists, it is possible that the op-
erational requirements decided on will not correspond (a) to the
real need, (b) to the technical possibilities.
In other words, an Operational Research Section can act usefully
by i nterpreting
(a) the operational facts of life to the technical establishments f
and
(b) the technical possibilities to the operational staffs,
A considerable wastage of war effort has occurred through lack of
this joint discussion.
Nothing in this Section or in Section 2 should be taken as im-
plying that an Operational Research Section should be the only chan-
nel by which a technical establishment obtains operational experience-
on the contrary the direct contact between a technical establishment
and operational units is generally essential,
5, ORGANISATION AND PERSONNEL
An Operational Research Section should be an integral part of a
Command and should work in the closest collaboration with the various
departments at the Command,
The head of the Operational Research Section should be directly
responsible to the Commander-in-Chief and may with advantage be
appointed as his scientific adviser.
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A considerable fraction of the staff of an Operational Research Sec-
tion should be of the very highest standing in science, and many of them
should be drawn from those who have had experience at the Service tech-
nical establi shments„
An Operational Research Section which contents itself with the
routine production of statistical reports and narratives will be of very
limited value. The atmosphere required is that of a first-class pure
scientific research institution, and the calibre of the personnel should
match this. All members of an Operational Research Section should spend
part of their time at operational stations in close touch with the per-
sonnel actually on the job,
6. NEW DEVICES
"New weapons for old J is apt to become a very popular cry. The
success of some new devices has led to a new form of escapism which
runs somewhat thus — d 0ur present equipment doesn't work very well,
training is bad ? supply is poor J( spare parts non-esistent. Lets
have an entirely new gadget! Then comes the vision of the new gadget,
springing like Aphrodite from the Ministry of Aircraft Production, in
full production s complete with spares, and attended by a chorus of
trained crews.
One of the tasks of an Operational Research Section is to make
possible at least an approach to a numerical estimate of the merits
of a change over from one device to another
:
by continual investi-
gation of the actual performance of existing weapons, and by ob-
jective analysis of the likely performance of new ones.
The actual operational effectiveness over a period of time of
any weapon can usefully (even if platitudinously) be considered as
the product of three factors; the first hl[t) is the number in use,
expressed as a function of the time, the second P is the scheduled
performance of the weapon, and the third Sit) is the average state
of serviceability and training; i,e, a the actual performance ex-
pressed as a fraction of the schedule. The probable form of U[t)
could be obtained from the production statistics of existing weapons,
Relatively little is known of the form of Sit), but probably a good
first approximation would be to take S[t) oc
(
j .= £-£T] wnere ^
is of the order of two months to one year according to the type of
gadget. Some operational research might usefully be directed
towards elucidating this function. One could then attempt a nu-
merical estimate of the gain or loss involved in the change over
from one device to another^ and so attempt to avoid the unduly
heavy costs of too rapid change over.
In general, one might conclude that relatively too much
scientific effort has been expended hitherto in the production of
new devices and too little in the proper use of what we have got.
Thus, there is a strong general case for moving many of the best
scientists from the technical establishments to the operational
Commands, at any rate for a time. If, and when ; they return to
technical work* they will be often much more useful by reason of





Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington, D„ C 8
FF1/A3-1 19 August 1945
Serial. 6565
From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and
Chief of Naval Operations
To: The Secretary of the Navy
Subj„ Continuation of Operations Research Group s Provisions for
l e Since April 1942 the Operations Research Group has been of
service to the Navy as a scientific advisory group to the forces
afloat and to the Commander in Chief , United States Fleet and
Chief of Naval Operations, dealing with naval scientific evalu-
ation from the point of view of the operational user of naval
equipment. This group has been of active assistance in:
(a) The evaluation of new equipment to meet military
requi rements.




gun supports AA Fire, from studies of
action reports.
(c) The evaluation and analysis of tactical problems
to measure the operational behavior of new material,
(d) The development of new tactical doctrines to meet




(e) The technical aspect of strategic planning.,
(f) The liaison for the Fleets with the development
and research laboratories » naval and extra-naval
.
2 The Group carrying out this work consists of civilian scien-
tific personnel under individual contract with the Office of
Field Service of the Office of Scientific Research and Develop-
ment, assigned to and responsible to the Commander in Chief j,
United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, Previous to
the formation of the Office of Field Service , the Group was






Subj Continuation of Operations Research Group> Provisions for
The Group at present consists of about seventy scientists with a
current annual operating budget of approximately $800,000,
3„ This group does not concern itself primarily with the tech-
nical and scientific problems of research and development of
new material. As the name implies* these personnel are
scientific evaluators who concern themselves with the opera-
tional problems (material and tactical) of the Fleet, Their
functions therefore, are properly a part of the seagoing command,
4„ I feel that an uninterrupted continuation of this service
into peacetime is necessary. Action should be taken at this
time in order to preclude any discontinuity upon cessation of
hosti li ties*
5„ I therefore recommend that suitable provisions be made to
continue this Group into peacetime at approximately twenty-five



























SYMBOL. Operations Evaluation Group
:
DCNO (0p03EG)
POSITION. Operations Evaluation Group
GROUP, DCNO (Fleet Operations and Readiness)
TASKS AND FUNCTIONS;
lo To act as advisor to DCNO (Fleet Operations and Readiness.)
in all matters pertaining to those aspects (tactics or material)
of Naval warfare under his cognizance to which operations
analysis is applicable*
2. To act through its established tie-lines (Scientific
Analysts), or on request and by the authority of DCNO (Fleet
Operations and Readiness) , as advisor to other parts of the
naval organization (including the forces afloat) in all
matters related to.
Evaluation of new developments to meet military
requi rementSo Analysis of specific operations
such as air or gunfire support activities; or
the defense of task forces against undersea or
ai r attack.
Analysis of tactical problems with relation to
the effects of the introduction of new technology
.
Development of new tactical doctrine to meet
specific operational problems„
Analysis of enemy capabilities,
Technical aspect of strategic planning.
Liaison between the fleets and the development
and research laboratories. Naval and extra-Naval,
3o To provide the forces afloat, through representatives assigned
to them with such assistance as operations analysis can offer
in making the best use of present and forthcoming equipment as
operational circumstances permit,
4„ To provide the Naval Research and Development Review Board
with such studies of the Naval research and development
program as may be required to ascertain the degree to which




the program mathceSj, both in content and in emphasis, the present
and probable future operational needs of the fleets.
5„ To keep properly informed of all matters concerning
operations, intelligence, new developments, and planning^ as
may be required for the proper exercise of advisory function
in these matters
„
6„ To initiate such studies as may be required to maintain a
state of readiness to act in an advisory capacity in the
matters listed above.




Subj . Naval Warfare Analysis Group
1„ General Designation , The Naval Warfare Analysis Group
(NAVWAG) is a group of
-
civilian scientists established to act in
an advisory capacity to the Chief of Naval Operations on
certain long range problems of naval warfare planning.
II. Tas k and Functions
1 NAVWAG will act as adviser to 0p93 in all matters
pertaining to the long range missions;, tasks,
and requirements of the Navy to which the methods
of operations research may be applicable,
2. NAVWAG will act on request and by the authority
of 0p93 s as adviser to other parts of the naval
organization in all matters related to.
a. The analysis of tasks which must be performed
to carry out the long range responsibilities
of the Navy,
b The analysis of world technology as it
affects performance of these tasks,
c. The analysis of capabilities required to
perform the tasks
.
d The analysis of optimum vehicles, weapons
systems and techniques for achieving these
capabilities, and their adaptability to
and effects on established strategic
concepts
,
e. The analysis of required directions of
weapons and vehicle developments
f» The evaluation of required compos iti on of
forces,
.
3. By the authority of 0p93 ? NAVWAG will participate in
such committees and conferences of the Naval
establishment that pertain to the long range
planning problems of naval warfare and are necessary
to the completion of the above tasks.
Enclosure (2) to




4„ NAVWAG will keep properly informed of all matters
concerning operations, intelligence, new developments
,
planning* world technology and enemy capabilities
as may be required for the proper exercise of
advisory function in these matters.
5. NAVWAG will initiate such studies as may be
required to maintain a state of readiness to act
in an advisory capacity in the matters listed
above,,
IIIo Administration
1. NAVWAG, including scientific and such clerical
personnel as may be required, will be established
by contract with the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
2. The Director of NAVWAG will report to the Director^
Long Range Objectives Group (LROG, 0p93). Their
relationship is indicated below.
a„ In general ?) a close and intimate liaison between
scientific (NAVWAG) and military personnel of
the LROG will be maintained.,
b Projects and priorities will be assigned to the
Director, NAVWAG, by the Director, LROG.
c„ The Director, NAVWAG, will be responsible for the
direction 9 progress* and completion of all
projects undertaken by NAVWAG.
d„ NAVWAG, through the Director, will have the
authority to generate its own projects „
3 The Director, LROG, shall be responsible for pre-
scribing and maintaining effective liaison and in-
formation for the use of NAVWAG in properly fulfilling
its tasks and functions.
4. The Director, LR0G s shall be responsible for the
distribution of all reports or studies rendered in
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OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5000. 29C
From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: Distribution List
Subj; Functions and organization of the Center for Naval Analyses
and its relationships with the Department of the Navy
1. Purpose. To describe the functions and organization of the Center
for Naval Analyses (CNA) and its administrative and operational relation-
ships with the Department of the Navy.




a. As a result of the Naval Research Advisory Committee recommenda-
tion to improve the Navy Department study effort and a subsequent con-
solidation and reorganization of efforts in this field, CNA was formed
on 1 July 1962. On 1 August 1967 ? the University of Rochester, Rochester ,
New York t became We^ "contractor for CN"A.^
b. It is the policy of the Department of the Navy to have officers
of the Navy and Marine Corps participate with CNA personnel in the study
effort in order to:
(1) Inject operational experience, military judgment, and
realism and help ensure relevance of all studies from their inception.
(2) Assist in providing answers and analyses for the current
and future problems and programs of the Navy and Marine Corps.
(3) Ensure that the analyses made in studies are presented in a
manner which facilitates their use in the decision-making process.
4. Orgam zati on of CNA. CNA* with headquarters in Arlington, Virginia,




Administ ration and Staff Senior Scientists. CNA consists of the fol-
lowing operating groups'," each headed by a Director who is responsible
to the President:
a. The Operations Evaluation Group (0EG) s with field representa-
tives located with the various fleet staffs and commands.
b. The Institute of Naval Studies (INS).
c. The Naval Warfare Analysis Group (NAVWAG).
d. The Marine Corps Operations Analysis Group (MCOAG). MCOAG
includes a sub-group at the Development Center, Marine Corps Develop-
ment and Education Commands, Quantico, Virginia^ and field representa-
ti ves
.
e. The Systems Evaluation Group (SEG).
5. Functions of CNA
a. CNA is charged with conducting a continuing program of research,
studies and investigations which will assist the Department of the Navy
in making management decision in the application and development of
naval capabilities and to assist the operating forces of the Department
of the Navy with operational analyses to help improve current operation-
al capabilities and to provide an operational data base for other
studies and analyses which include, but are not limited to s the following;
(1) In accordance with a program developed by the Scientific
Officer to CNA? the Marine Corps General Officer Representative (for
MCOAG studies and for CNA matters relating to Marine Corps and Landing
Forces) and CNA* studies and investigations are undertaken with regard
to problems in naval warfare in the broadest sense. This program
includes* but is not limited to 9 operational and logistic aspects of
naval warfare, including those aspects peculiar to the landing forces;
analyses of current Fleet and Fleet Marine Force readiness; proposals
for naval and landing force applications of new developments and tech-
nology; studies of development and procurement; naval and landing force
long-range requirements for equipment B material personnel and supporting
services; and naval implications of nationa objectives s policies and
resources. Approximately 72% of CNA" s effor t is devoted to this area
of con trac t performanceY
(2) In response to requirements initiated by CNA, the CNA




Navy and CNA agree are Navy-on ented Approximately 23% of CNA s effort
is devoted to this area of contract performance
,
(3) In augmentation of the programs set forth in subparagraphs
(1) and (2) above, CNA conducts fundamental unclassified research and
studies in areas of long- range interest and potential use to the Navy
at the contractor's Campus, Rochester, New York, or elsewhere. Such
research, studies and investigations include, but are not limited to,
research in economics, political science, social science, applied
mathematics and the physical and engineering sciences. Approximately
5% of CNA's effort is devoted to this area of contract performance,
b. The specific functions of each of the operating groups are as
follows:
(1) OEG maintains liaison with Navy laboratories, furnishes
analytical services to the fleets, assists in the design of operational
exercises to improve the acquisition of meaningful exercise data and
conducts analyses and makes reports with respect to the proximate time
frame on such subjects as the evaluation of the capabilities of new
equipment to meet military requirements, the evaluation of specific
phases of operations through an examination of action and exercise
reports, the evaluation and analysis of tactical problems, the
development of new tactical doctrines to meet specific requirements
and the technical aspects of strategic planning,
(2) INS conducts studies, analyses and investigations of long-
range naval problems and the future contributions of naval officers to
national security and objectives „ The INS program includes analyses
of the changing nature of warfare and future threats to seapower, the
implications and effects of advances of science and technology on
seapower, the international environment and situations, including the
possible use of force, resources and other economic factors affecting
naval forces, implications of sociological factors in the naval warfare,
naval functions, postures, and capabilities to support future require-
ments, means of attaining required naval capabilities and forecasts
of likely enemy capabilities and the use of these capabilities in the
sea environment.
(3) NAVWAG conducts studies of the mid-range period concerning
such subjects as the tasks which should be performed to carry out the
future commitments of naval forces, the effect of the state of technol-
ogy upon the nature of these responsibilities and tasks, the capabili-
ties required to perform the tasks, the optimum weapons systems and
techniques for achieving these capabilities and their adaptability to
and effects on established strategic concepts, the recommended di-




of alternative mixes and levels of forces.
(4) MCOAG furnishes analytical services for, participates in,
and contributes to the overall study effort of the Marine Corps
embracing current , mid- range and long-range problems,,
(5) SEG initiates and improves methodology , models , and data
for the purpose of analytically relating systems performance character-
istics to systems physical characteristics and systems costs » provides
model s, data, and knowledgeable personnel to projects throughout CNA,
maintains liaison with the Navy laboratories and conducts formally
directed studies and projects which focus primarily on technological
issues.
6. Organization of the Navy Department with respect to CNA
a. In recognition of the nature of CNA's research and study
effort and of the contribution that can be made through the injec-
tion of operational experience, principles of warfare , military
judgment, and realism into the overall study effort* and to ensure
the responsiveness of this program to the needs and problems of the
Navy, there have been designated within the Off i ce of the Ch i ef of
Naval Operations a Scientific Officer and a Deputy Scien tific Offi-
cer who are responsible for CNA matters . There has also been desig-
nated within Headquarters Marine Corps a representative of the Com-
mandant who is responsible for CNA matters relating to the Marine
Corps and Landing Forces. These designations are as follows:
(1) Scientific Officer to CNA - Di rector , Navy Program Plan-
ning (Op-090).
(2) Deputy Scientific Officer to CNA - Director, Systems
Analysis Division (Op- 96).
(3) Marine Corps General Officer Representative - Deputy
Chief of Staff (Research, Development and Studies), USMC.
b. In order to provide a close coupling between the Navy and
CNA, the Scientific Officer assigns a naval officer as CNO Project
Officer for each study conduct in accordance with paragraph 57a. (T)
above ." In general , the duties of the CNO Project Officer are to
provide strategic, tactical and technical inputs as some of the
study inputs to be used and to monitor studies for the Scientific
Officer. The assignment of CNO Project Officers is^ subject to the
general acceptance of the Presi_de_nt_ 9_CNA 8
c. In addition to the assignment of CNO Project Officers, a




(CNA) for participation in the study program at CNA, These officers
report to an Assistant Technical Director for Naval Matters (ATDNM)
at CNA . The ATDNM is a nava l officer sele cted by th e Navy anJ subject
to the acceptance of the President, CNAV The ATDNM reports to the
Scientific Officer for duty with the President, CNA 3 and he receives
his work assignments from the President, CNA, Appropriately qualified
officers in the Operations Study Group (CNA) may be given the opportu-
nity to direct some of studies at the discretion of the President,
CNAo
7 CNA/Military Organization al Relationships
a. The President* CNA, and the Directors of the CNA operating
groups are responsive to the Scientific Officer and Deputy Scientific
Officer with respect to planning, coordination, progress and quality
of the analyses and studies
.
The Marine Corps Representative acts
as the foe aT point for Marine Corps matters relating to CNA and ef-
fects coordination with the Scientific Officer on all such matters.
In addition, in coordination with the Scientific Officer, he main=
tains close contact with* and provides military advice and guidance
to, the President^ CNA in connection with Marine Corps and Landing
Force matters.
b, The Director, 0E6 S is responsive to the Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations (Fleet Operations and Readiness) for the service performed
by OEGo
Co The Directors, INS,-, NAVWAG and SEG are responsive to the Scien-
tific Officer to CNA (Op -090) for the services performed by INS, NAVWAG
and SEG f respectively.
do The Director* MCOAG is responsive to the Marine Corps Represen-
tative for the studies and services performed by MCOAG,
e The Chief of Naval Research, as Contracting Officer, is respon-
sible for administra ti on of the CNA contract with Un i versity of Rochester ,
8 8 Responsibilities of the Scienti fi c Officer to CNA ; The responsibili-
ties of the Scientific Officer i nclude, but are not limited to, the
fol lowi ng.
a. Represents the Chief of Naval Operations in CNA matters and acts
as Study Sponsor for CNA studies conducted in accordance with paragraph
5,a,(l) by INS, NAVWAG or SEG,
b, Maintains close contact with,- and provides military advice and




c. Determines the technical responsiveness and adequacy of CNA
performance under the contract.
d. With the assistance of the Marine Corps Representative and key
CNA personnel , develops and maintains a study program designed to cover
the mid- range and long-range aspects of seapower in the broadest sense,
e. In conjunction with the Marine Corps Representative and Chief
of Naval Research t prepares the annual budget for support of the CNA
st udy program and all changes thereto ,
f. Promulgates completed CNA study reports as directed by the
Chief of Naval Operations and determines the necessary distribution
therefor. However, OEG study reports shall be promulgated and distri-
buted by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Fleet Operations and
Readiness.)
g. Consults with the Chief of Naval Research regarding any
planned or actual departures from the effective CNA contract document.
9. Res pons i vi 1 i ti es of the Deputy - Sci enti f i c Of ficer to CNA (O p- 96>) .
In addition to his general authority to exercise all functions of and
for the Scientific Officer, specific duties of the Deputy Scientific
Officer include^ but are not limited to s the following:
a. In collaboration with the Marine Corps Representative and the
Directors of the CNA operating groups, plans and recommends to the
Scientific Officer the overall study program of CNA, assists in
organizing study projects as requested by CNA, and ensures adequate
guidance to CNA on a continuing basis.
b„ Maintains liaison with the Marine Corps Representative as
necessary to assure desired representation and coordination on all
studies of joint Navy/Marine Corps interest.
c. Advises the Scientific Officer on CNA performance.
d. Acts as point of contact for the Scientific Officer in CNA
matters.
e. Prepares the annual CNA budget estimate for the Scientific
Officer.
f. Performs necessary administrative functions in connection
with the CNA contract as delegated by the Chief of Naval Research,
including certification as to technical necessity in appropriate
cases, processing of security clearance requests, and certifica-




10, Responsibili ties o f CNO Project Officers at CNA : As principal
representative of the Scientific Officer and the Deputy Scientific
Officer, the CNO Project Officer s responsibilities with respect
to the study include evaluation of CNA performance with respect to
planning, coordination, progress and quality of the study, liaison
between the Navy Department and CNA, assistance to the CNA Study
Director and monitoring the study for the Scientific Officer,, In
these areas, he will accomplish specific tasks as follows
a 8 Prepares the Study Directive; working with Op-96 and co-
cordinating with CNA to ensure the feasibility of accomplishing
the objectives desired,
b Reviews the draft Study Plan, study group working papers
and study reports, providing comments and recommendations to Op-96
and the Advisory Committee as appropriateo These comments should
indicate whether the Study Plan, working papers, study reports and
other official documents produced by the study group are consistent
with the requirements of the Study Directive,
Co Maintains liaison with cognizant OPNAV offices ; others in-
terested naval activities, including the Fleets and other Service
and DOD activities (through appropriate channels) in order (1) to
provide the CNA study group with data, experience and study inputs
that these activities can make available, (2) to inform these ac-
tivities of significant developments in methodology, significant
assumptions and terms of reference used by the study group, problem
areas encountered and results obtained; and (3) to advise these
activities of study findings which affect established Navy doctrine
and planSo
do Ensures that regular, frequent meetings of the Advisory
Committee are held»
e. Collaborates with the CNA Study Director in preparing pre-
sentations and briefings on study progress -, findings and results as
may be required,, In this regard, he shall prepare appropriate
announcements for such briefings and presentations and assist in
preparing appropriate backup material for such presentations. In
addition, he shall prepare appropriate minutes and memoranda for
the record as may be directed by the Deputy Scientific Officer,
f. Assists in obtaining information which the CNA Study Di-
rector deems relevant to the study, To this end, assist in identi-
fying activities where relevant information may be found, in
arranging visits of study group personnel to such activities and in




g. Provides to the CNA Study Director military advice and guidance
concerning Navy policy, strategic, tactical and operational concepts
(e.go, established Navy doctrine and plans), and technical information,
and review ongoing analysis to ensure that the group is aware of of-
ficial Navy concepts* strategy, tactics and technology,
h. Ensures that the CNA Study Director is fully aware of all direc-
tives and guidance provided by the Scientific Officer and the Advisory
Committee
„
io Advises the CNA Study Director with respect to past and ongoing
studies which are related to his study.
jo Advises the CNA Study Director with respect to the classifica-
tion of information developed in the study
„
k. In the case of warfare studies,; develops with OPNAV a DIA-
approved threat for suitable reference by the CNA Study Director in
the study,
1 , Ensures that Navy comments and recommendations are transmitted
to the CNA Study Director in a timely manner so that he can assure their
adequate consideration,,
m Reports periodically to the Deputy Scientific Officer on the
progress and responsiveness of the study, the development of significant
findings and the need for special assistance to the study group as such
needs develop,
n» Ensures that research and development implications resulting
from the analysis are clearly and adequately highlighted in the study
report,
o. In the event of controversy between CNA and the Department of
the Navy about the methodology » data, or conclusions of a study, as-
sures that the study report contains all conflicting positions «,
p. Upon completion of the final draft study report;
(1) Forwards sufficient copies of the study report to 0p-96S
with a recommended distribution list for OPNAV review
,
(2) With the assistance of the Op-96 Study Monitor collates
review comments and prepares a Navy position on the report, providing
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(3) With the assistance of the Op-96 Study Monitor, prepares
a draft CNO endorsement and one page summary in accordance with cur-
rent instructions,
11 „ Responsibilities of the ATDNM. Specific duties of the ATDNM in-
elude the following
a Maintains liaison with the Bureau of Naval Personnel, the
Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations in order to ensure the assignment of appropriately quali-
fied personnel to CNA studies
b Assigns officers attached to the Operations Study Group (CNA)
to CNA studies to meet the requirements of the President; CNA,
c. Supervises the performance of duty of officers attached to the
Operations Study Group (CNA) and supervises other military and civil
service personnel assigned to studies on a temporary duty basis.
d Supervises the administrative aspects of the participation of
the military and civil service personnel assigned to CNA studies,
cooperating with the CNA Security Administrator to ensure that such
personnel receive proper indoctrination into the CNA security system
and are cleared of custody of all documents under CNA control prior
to their detachment from the study groups
e Provides appropriate assistance to CNO Project Officers in
matters relating to naval administration.
12„ Responsibi lities o f Officers Attached to the Operations Study
Group ( CNA)V Specific duties of officers attached to the Operations
Study Group (CNA) include the following.
a Participate in the conduct of the studies to which assigned as
a full time member of the study group, performing such duties as may be
directed by the CNA Study Director
b Assist the CNO Project Officer in obtaining valid study inputs
from naval sources for use in the analysis.
/s/ B u A, Clarey
B„ Ao CLAREY
Vice Chief of Naval Operations
Distribution List.
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